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Introduction  
Twenty-five years after the collapse of communism in Europe, few scholars disagree that the 
past—increasingly conceptualized in terms of both pre-communist and communist histories—
continues to shape post-communist states’ democratic trajectories.1 One simple message that 
emerges from recent theorizing into post-communist Europe’s “multiple pasts” is that we 
ought to distinguish between the good and the bad legacies—also described as “assets” and 
“liabilities.”2 Certain pre-communist legacies have arguably persisted through the communist 
experience into the present; facilitated or dampened resistance to communism; or had been 
absorbed to varying extents depending on communism’s affinity with pre-communist orders.3 
 Pre-communist literacy and schooling have featured prominently in this literature’s 
good, or “asset”-type, bundle of legacies. States possessing legacies of comparatively 
advanced literacy and schooling have been arguably most resistant to the anti-democratic 
influences of communism. Conversely, not only were formerly backward areas ostensibly 
more likely to regard communism in a positive light, but their record of underdeveloped pre-
communist schooling also stultified the growth of democratic societal institutions and values. 
Furthermore, where schooling had been rudimentary, minority ethnic groups in the imperial 
borderlands had not been arguably extensively exposed to national myths antithetical to 
communism.
4
  
 We here propose a different mechanism that challenges the linearity of the above 
assumptions based on an analysis of the effect of pre-communist literacy on communist party 
recruitment in Russia. Rather than regarding pre-communist education as a source of latent 
resistance to communism, we highlight the Bolsheviks’ successful appropriation of the better-
educated strata. We argue that these processes helped subvert the past democratic edge of the 
comparatively developed areas. This “reversal of fortune”5-type argument is supported by 
substantial sovietology scholarship pointing to the party’s preference for a selection of literate 
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cadre; to the over-supply of party members in sophisticated centers of learning and culture; 
and to the development of a vested interest in the soviet system among the nomenklatura.
6
 To make our case, we first explore patterns of co-variance between tsarist-era literacy 
and post-communist democratic variations in Russia’s sub-national regions (stage one) and 
between regional pre-communist education and communist party saturation (stage two). 
Based on the results of the above analysis, we pursue mediation analysis to distinguish 
between the direct and indirect (through party saturation) effects of pre-communist literacy on 
post-communist democratic outcomes (stage three). Our linear regression analysis of author-
assembled statistics from imperial Russia’s first, 1897, census supports prior research: pre-
communist literacy indeed has a strong positive association with post-communist democratic 
outcomes. Yet, mediation analysis reveals that this effect is mediated by communist party 
saturation in Russia’s regions. Generally, we find higher party saturation levels in the 
formerly more literate areas. Party saturation in turn has had an apparently dampening effect 
on the otherwise positive effects of pre-communist education on post-communist democracy.  
 Our findings have wider implications for theory-building on types of legacies that 
might explain long-term political regime trajectories going beyond post-communist settings. 
Specifically, our study highlights how in particular historical contexts education can enhance, 
rather than undermine, authoritarian tendencies and regime consolidation. Our argument is 
distinct from those that focus on the socialization component of schooling—and 
indoctrination—under authoritarian or totalitarian systems.7 Rather, it highlights how in 
politically-fluid settings, the possession of a human capital advantage can facilitate social 
repositioning and (re)-deployment in the service of a new regime. As Dankwart Rustow’s 
discussion of the education credentials of many an enabler of a 20
th
 century dictatorial system 
reminds us, education may not always straightforwardly co-vary with democratic political 
action.
8
 As such, our argument occupies a middle ground between rationalist and culturalist 
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assumptions about human behavior, at the same time also nuancing the premises of classic 
modernization theorizing.
9
 The persistence of literacy’s democratic effects over time 
highlights the element of stability in value reproduction, including in the reproduction of 
democratic values associated with modernization legacies. Yet, the appropriation dimension 
of our argument simultaneously brings out the possibility of rational responses to shifting 
material (and symbolic) opportunities under a new—authoritarian—system, and the 
concomitant processes of subversion of prior value and behavioral orientations. These insights 
in turn have implications for research on critical junctures.
10
 They highlight how the genesis 
of an entirely new order might lead to a swift modification of preferences and behaviors 
among the better-educated strata in ways that may not be explicable with reference to the 
modernization or cultural persistence strands of democracy theorizing.  
 Our paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we discuss the debates on the 
democratic effects of education legacies in post-communist settings and outline our 
hypotheses. Next, we perform statistical analysis of the impact of pre-communist literacy on 
regional party saturation and the implications of these dynamics for regional democratic 
governance. We then further unpack the relevant mechanisms based on an historical 
discussion of the links between education and communist party recruitment; and of how these 
legacies might impinge on regional democracy. We also provide an illustrate case study of 
Ivanovo, a region that typifies the appropriation and subversion patterns uncovered in our 
study. The final section concludes with a discussion of the implications of our analysis for 
historical legacies scholarship.  
  
Debates on Education Legacies in Communist States 
We here adopt Stephen Kotkin and Mark Beissinger’s definition of a legacy as “a durable 
causal relationship between past institutions and policies on subsequent practices and beliefs, 
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long beyond the life of the regimes, institutions, and policies that gave birth to them.” We 
concur that this causal relationship can emerge “. . . often in new form and to new purpose” in 
situations of “a significant rupture … – an end to one order and the beginning of another – 
that the legacy is supposed to straddle.”11 The emphasis in these conceptualizations on the 
creation of new durable phenomena out of something else in the past allows us to better 
capture some of the otherwise inexplicable post-communist political outcomes than if we 
were to employ Jason Wittenberg’s alternative influential conceptualization of a legacy as an 
end result of an earlier “instantation” of a similar phenomenon.12 For instance, in our analysis, 
we are not simply tracing the links between pre-communist education and variations in 
communist education across space—essentially the same broad phenomena. Rather, we 
uncover how pre-communist literacy might have shaped, and helped reproduce over time, an 
entirely different phenomenon associated with an entirely new order—communist party 
recruitment. We also analyse how party saturation in turn shaped yet another phenomenon of 
regional democratic variations. Furthermore, by highlighting how an “asset”-type legacy 
might facilitate the reproduction of “liability”-type legacies we also interrogate alternative 
definitions that stress continuity and mutual reinforceability
13
, rather than the complexity, 
mutability, or even the potential for mutual cancellation
14
 of distinct types of legacies.  
  Our objective is to investigate the role of two interdependent sets of legacies—(1) the 
legacy of pre-communist literacy; and (2) communist party saturation—in accounting for 
regional post-communist democratic variations. Accordingly, our analysis covers patterns of 
inter-temporal reproduction, redeployment, and appropriation of human capital; and of the 
reproduction of values, practices, and behaviours that straddle two sets of “ruptures”15 or 
“critical junctures”16: (a) the rupture with the tsarist order after the Bolsheviks Revolution in 
1917; and (b) the break with the communist order when the Soviet Union disintegrated in 
1991.  
5 
 
 We distinguish between two bodies of scholarship relevant to the debates on education 
legacies in post-communist states. The first set of studies focuses on communist education 
and its effects on democratic values. This scholarship encompasses the earlier paradigmatic 
debates between modernizers
17
 and proponents of the homo sovieticus argument.
18
 Those 
paradigm wars
19
 were concerned with the question of whether communist education would, 
and whether it did, in 1989-1991, lead to the collapse of communism—as classic 
modernization theorists would predict;
20
 or, alternatively, whether it helped nurture anti-
democratic values. As such, these debates had little to say about pre-communist learning and 
its relevance to the communist project.  
 The second, more recent, group of studies is less temporally “shallow”21 in that it 
broadens the scope of analysis to include pre-communist education legacies. Much of this 
scholarship has been limited to highlighting general continuities between pre-communist 
modernization and post-communist developmental and regime divergences.
22
 The notable 
exceptions to the broad historical discussions about the longue durée of education in post-
communist Europe are the recent agenda-setting studies by Keith Darden and Anna Grzymala 
Busse; Grigore Pop-Eleches and Joshua Tucker; and Leonid Peisakhin.
23
 These works 
specifically analyse how pre-communist education might have shaped receptivity or 
resistance to the communist project. We therefore discuss them at some length. 
 Darden and Grzymala-Busse argue that pre-communist schools in Austria’s imperial 
borderlands nurtured mass nationalist orientations antithetical to communism. By contrast, in 
the Russian Empire schooling had been less developed and more focused on inculcating 
Russian nationalist values. This arguably explains the weaker democratic proclivities in 
territories formerly ruled by the Russian Empire. In the study, literacy statistics are employed 
to proxy for schooling. Peisakhin advances a similar argument. He analyses democratic and 
nationalist value orientations among Ukrainian communities in formerly Austrian Galicia and 
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imperial Russian Volhynia and Podolia. Peisakhin’s work is grounded in established 
theorizing on the socialization component of education.
24
 He argues that in formerly Austrian 
areas, school teachers, along with family members and community leaders, may have 
continued to nurture values antithetical to communism that they absorbed via the educational 
institutions of the past order. In formerly Russian domains, particularly in Podolia, which 
became part of communist Ukraine in the 1920s (Galicia and Volhynia came under Polish 
rule in the interwar period), by contrast, the communists arguably confronted more malleable 
citizens. These citizens had arguably enjoyed only rudimentary schooling prior to communist 
rule. And, they had been subjected to imperial curricula intolerant of the ethnic minorities’ 
nascent conceptions of nationhood. While the above studies focus more narrowly on 
education as an incubator of nationalist, and, by extension, anti-communist, sentiment, Pop-
Eleches and Tucker are generally concerned with the democratic implications of socialization 
in schools. All three bodies of research also hint that a more straightforward modernization 
mechanism might be simultaneously at work even though they eschew framing it as such. For 
instance, an argument is made that “countries with high levels of pre-communist literacy and 
economic development. . . were less likely to equate communism with developmental 
progress than their counterparts in more backward pre-communist countries.”25 Irrespective of 
the particular lens taken, these studies share an emphasis on imperial education as a driver of 
resistance to communism.  
 The above work has done much to sensitize us to both the wider macro-structural 
modernization legacies that may have persisted through the communist period, and to 
illuminate the micro-societal and socialization processes of value transmission through 
education. We acknowledge our intellectual debt to this research. Yet, we also find the logic 
of the above theorizing wanting in light of the historical evidence on the over-representation 
of the better-educated strata not only among the “Revolutionary vanguard,” but also among 
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the party’s rank-and-file.26 Prior research also tells us that many party members could trace 
their lineage to the better-educated groups of the pre-communist orders. These observations 
apply both to states at the bottom end of pre-communist modernization like Russia, and those 
at its top end like Hungary.
27
 
  To what extent are the influences of the better-educated strata on the installation and 
consolidation of communist rule reflected in recent comparative scholarship? Darden and 
Grzymala-Busse’s study investigates the democracy-inducing potential of pre-communist 
mass education. It does not systematically explore how education shaped recruitment into the 
communist party, which, as discussed in the historical section of our paper, had come to 
embody the soviet elite.
28
 Pop-Eleches and Tucker likewise focus on mass value orientations. 
They discuss the interaction between pre-communist education and exposure to socialization 
in Leninist regimes in terms of the dampening effects of imperial education on the potentially 
democracy-corrosive influences of communism.  
 Peisakhin’s research does feature the educated village “elites” as key reproducers of 
anti-communist values. Yet it also hints at the ambivalence inherent in the disjuncture 
between popular preferences and the political positioning of the better-educated community 
strata in the new communist order. The study is particularly relevant for our theory when it 
comes to applying it to cases where communism was an external imposition rather than being 
home grown. This is an important distinction qualifying the scope of our argument. We 
address it in greater detail in the concluding section of the paper. Peisakhin surveys both the 
Polish territories annexed to Ukraine in 1939 and those incorporated into the USSR in the 
1920s. To begin with, he finds a high degree of continuity in the reproduction of the better-
educated imperial-era community leaders in that they continued to occupy positions of 
influence in communist Ukraine’s localities. The elite’s survival of the “institutional 
watershed” of the imposition of communist rule is a significant finding given what we know 
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about communist arrests, executions, and targeted exile of regime opponents. Clearly, there 
had been some degree of collaboration with the regime. The ambivalence is not fully resolved 
in Peisakhin’s study. We find for instance that while in Podolia, 73 percent of survey 
respondents joined the party’s youth wing, the Komsomol, 33 and 44 percent of respondents 
joined it in Galicia and Volhynia, respectively. These are substantial numbers given the 
strength of anti-communist orientations in the latter two communities. While 41 percent of 
Podolians admitted to have been genuinely motivated by a “belief” in communism, no 
Galician opted for that answer, and only 6 percent of Volhynians answered it in the 
affirmative. The discrepancy between the share of true believers in communism and those 
who actually joined the Komsomol indicates that motivations for political advancement under 
the communist order were clearly also present among a significant stratum of even the most 
avowedly anti-communist societies. Accordingly, while community elite “policing” of 
adherence to patriotic anti-communist values is likely to have been at work, a significant 
proportion of the educated village strata may have simultaneously served as enablers of 
communist rule.  
 Our appropriation and subversion theory addresses these notable gaps and ambiguities 
in recent research. We accept that in ethnic minority borderlands, past literacy might have 
nurtured nationalist—and pro-democratic—sentiments. Because we observe the literacy-
democracy link even among the overwhelmingly ethnically Russian oblasti, we conjecture 
that a straightforward modernization mechanism may also account for variations in post-
communist regime outcomes. Yet, we simultaneously observe that the more literate areas 
supplied greater numbers of party recruits. This is why we have labeled the first part of our 
causal argument appropriation. Prior scholarship suggests that party membership may have 
helped nurture sentiments antithetical to democracy.
29
 We also know that former ruling party 
members and their descendants have continued to enjoy access to power in many post-
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communist settings.
30
 Rather than serving as forces of latent resistance to communism, the 
better-educated individuals, once appropriated by the new regime, may have paradoxically 
facilitated the subversion of democracy in the hitherto more developed areas—our second 
causal claim. We therefore advance the following hypotheses: 
H1: Pre-communist literacy will have a positive effect on post-communist democracy in 
Russia’s regions. 
H2: Pre-communist literacy will be positively associated with regional communist party 
saturation (appropriation). 
H3: Regional party saturation will mediate the effects of pre-communist literacy on post-
communist democracy (subversion). 
Figure 1 provides a visual illustration of the hypothesized mechanisms. 
 
[Figure 1] 
 To test our hypotheses, we employ the “the sub-national comparative method.”31 Our 
units of observation are the constituent regions of the Russian Federation. Russia’s territories 
possess variable pre-communist historical legacies of literacy development and, generally, 
modernization. They encompass regions populated by minority ethnic groups like the Volga 
Germans with a record of cultural autonomy, advanced schooling, and superior levels of 
literacy pre-dating communism; and those populated by groups that had been overwhelmingly 
illiterate in the imperial period; sophisticated centers of culture and commerce like St. 
Petersburg; and Black Earth hamlets where serfdom survived in all but name decades after 
peasant emancipation.
32
 Regional developmental experiences under communism also varied.
33
 
Finally, we observe substantial regional variations on our key outcome variable, post-
communist democracy.
34
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 Our within-nation research design allows us to augment earlier analyses of legacies in 
post-communist states. Scholars have identified the small-n problem as a significant challenge 
when performing cross-national analyses of post-communist political regime variations. 
Working with only twenty-eight or so observations places constraints on how many variables 
can be simultaneously included in a model. This in turn introduces the possibility of omitted 
variable bias.
35
 The “legacy family” issue presents another methodological challenge. Certain 
“good” legacies tend to go together—as would be the case with schooling, experience of 
democratic governance, or, generally, modernization in Austro-Hungarian territories. Given 
the “bundled” nature of legacies, it becomes difficult to disentangle the effect of education 
from other variables when national-level data are employed.  
 Our analysis goes some way towards addressing these issues. First, we are able to 
work with seventy-seven observations corresponding to Russia’s regions. (A discussion of 
matching tsarist gubernii and post-communist regions is provided in the Supplementary 
Appendix, SA, S1). Second, by analyzing territories in the “legacy family” of tsarist domains, 
we are able to better isolate the effect of particular sub-legacies such as literacy, on regional 
governance. Barring Kaliningrad and Tyva, our seventy-seven regions have formed part of 
tsarist Russia and the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) from the 1920s 
onwards. Sub-national analysis of one country allows us to hold constant the effects of 
national-level variables like temporal exposure to communist rule and over-time shifts in the 
nature of ruling regimes.
36
  
 We now proceed to describe our methods, variables, and data, and present results of 
statistical analysis.  
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Statistical Analysis  
Mediation and moderation 
We here distinguish between two main hypothetical types of relationships between imperial 
education and party saturation: moderation and mediation. Baron and Kenny distinguish 
between these two types of effects as follows.
37
 Let us assume that the research objective is to 
investigate how a predictor variable X affects the outcome variable Y (here X is pre-
communist education and Y is post-communist democracy). A moderator variable Z is a third 
variable, which affects the direction or strength of the effect of X on Y (in political science 
scholarship moderation is typically modeled employing interaction terms). A mediator 
variable Z is a variable which represents the “generative mechanism”38 through which X 
affects Y. “Whereas moderator variables specify when certain effects will hold, mediators 
speak to how or why such effects occur.”39 A mediator variable should therefore satisfy at 
least two criteria: the level of Z should be determined by the level of X, and the level of Y 
should be determined by the level of Z. If one blocks the causal path between X and Y 
through Z, the effect of X on Y could become insignificant; it is possible, however, that there 
is a remaining effect of X on Y (direct effect), which does not go through Z (it may go 
through other mediators as well). In moderator situations, there is no link between X and Z.
40
 
 In our analysis, the variable Z is Soviet-era party saturation. The theoretical discussion 
in the previous section suggests the appropriateness of applying the concept of mediation 
rather than moderation. We argue that the communist regime typically appropriated the better-
educated strata, leading to higher levels of party saturation in regions with comparatively high 
levels of pre-communist literacy. This would imply that the size of regional party 
organizations would correspond to pre-existing education levels in the regions; hence, pre-
communist education affected post-communist democracy both directly (through persistent 
cultural legacies) and indirectly (because it caused party saturation in regions to be higher 
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and, as a result, created a different – hypothetically negative – impact of the CPSU legacy on 
sub-national democracy). Moderation models are, from a theoretical standpoint, unsuitable for 
us. These models would imply that regions with similar pre-communist literacy levels should 
exhibit different levels of post-communist democracy because of differences in party 
saturation. However, they would fail to take account of the fact that—consistent with our 
theory—there is likely to be modest variation in party saturation in regions with similar 
literacy levels. This is because CPSU saturation would have been influenced by pre-
communist education levels. In addition to the conceptual rationale, there is also an empirical 
rationale dictating our choice of mediation models. Baron and Kenny suggest employing 
mediation analysis when a strong relationship exists between the predictor and outcome X 
and Y. They suggest that the alternative, moderation, form of analysis is appropriate for 
dealing with inconsistencies in relationships between these variables.
41
 As shown below, in 
our case the relationship between the two variables is strong and consistent.  
Empirically, to validate the mediation mechanism, we need to, first, demonstrate that 
X influences Z—that is, controlling for plausible alternative explanations, party saturation is 
predicted by pre-communist education; second, we need to demonstrate that there is a ceteris 
paribus effect of Z on Y—that is, controlling for plausible alternative explanations, party 
saturation levels allow us to predict the level of post-communist regional democracy; and 
third, that controlling for Z, the effect of X on Y changes in magnitude.  
 Generally speaking, mediation analysis could be pursued employing three equations. 
The first model regresses the outcome variable Y on the predictor variable X and on the 
mediator Z, as well as on appropriate controls. The second model regresses the mediator Z on 
the predictor variable X. The third model regresses Y on X, but not on Z. Intuitively, 
combined with the first model, the regression would demonstrate how the inclusion of Z in a 
set of controls changes the coefficient of X. The objective of mediation analysis is to obtain 
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the estimates of three quantities. The indirect, or mediation, effect, measures the part of the 
effect of X on Y which is going through Z—that is, how change in Z, caused by change in X, 
affects Y. The direct effect measures the “remaining” portion of the effect of X on Y, which is 
not going through Z. The total effect is the full effect of X on Y through all possible 
pathways—that is, through Z and not through Z. Intuitively, mediation analysis decomposes 
the total effect into direct and indirect effects.
42
  
Baron and Kenny offered an early approach to estimating three quantities of interest 
for cases of a continuous mediator and outcome. Recently, Imai et al. developed a general 
algorithm allowing the estimation of mediation effects for different types of mediators, 
outcomes and models,
43
 and implemented it in R.
44
 Hicks and Tingley provided the Stata code 
for this algorithm.
45
 Early approaches to mediation analysis typically relied on multiplication 
of slope coefficients of individual models described above and the evaluation of their 
statistical significance. These approaches suffered from two limitations: they were not 
applicable to non-linear models (this is less important for us, given our focus on continuous 
predictor and mediator variables); and were not appropriate for sensitivity analysis due to the 
sequential ignorability assumption. The Imai et al. approach solves these two problems. 
Technically, it first estimates the mediation analysis models described above for the observed 
values of the mediator and outcome variables; it then repeatedly simulates model parameters 
from their sampling distribution; and for each draw of parameters (we apply 1,000 draws) it 
simulates the potential values of the mediator and of the outcome, and computes the quantities 
of interest.
46
  
We employ both the Hicks and Tingley and the Imai et al. code to make sure that the 
choice of statistical software does not affect our results. The estimation of a mediation effect 
relies on the sequential ignorability assumption; in case there is a continuous mediator and a 
continuous outcome variables Z and Y, as in our paper, this assumption is violated if the error 
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terms in the first and second models described above are correlated. This assumption cannot 
be tested from the data, so it is advisable to perform sensitivity analysis showing how the 
results would change depending on the extent of correlation of error terms. Our paper 
implements the appropriate sensitivity analysis (SA S2). 
 
Data and measures 
Our measure of pre-communist education is population share of literates in tsarist Russia’s 
gubernii (literacy). We obtained these data from the first imperial census of 1897.
47
 Literacy 
is the most straightforward measure of pre-communist education absent systematic data on 
primary, secondary, and tertiary schooling. Literacy also tends to co-vary with another 
measure of pre-communist modernization for which data are readily available, urbanization.
48
 
Regional literacy varies in the range of 4-62 percent. 
 To capture regional party saturation, we employ the measure of the share of 
communist party members in proportion to regional adult population in 1976 (party 
saturation).
49
 Party saturation is in the range of 5-15 percent of regional adult population. We 
obtained these data from official publications of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
(CPSU). Prior research indicates that after 1976, regional levels of party saturation have 
remained fairly constant.
50
 
 To capture our key outcome variable democracy, we employ the indices developed by 
experts at two respected Russia-based think tanks, the Moscow Carnegie Center and the 
Independent Institute of Social Policy.
51
 The indices are based on expert assessments of 
regional democracy along ten dimensions and employing a five-point scale; the values of 
these dimensions are then added up to form a composite index. The lowest democracy score 
has the value of seventeen and the highest—forty-five. Further detail on the index is provided 
in SA S3. We employ the moving average democracy measure for the years 2000-2004, 
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thereby allowing for sufficient temporal distance from USSR’s collapse in 1991. This period 
also precedes Vladimir Putin’s re-centralization drive, which served to homogenize regional 
political landscapes while stopping short of completely obliterating democratic institutions in 
the more open regions.
52
 Earlier data for 1991-2001 are also employed to confirm that our 
results hold. Conceptually, the Carnegie score builds on the notion of “liberal democracy,” 
which encompasses both its procedural and substantive aspects.
53
  
 
Models and results 
Based on the logic of mediation analysis, we employ a three-step procedure. First, to test H1, 
we regress democracy on literacy, party saturation and a set of relevant covariates. We also 
run the regression without the party saturation variable. Our objective in this first stage is to 
explore how education legacies influence contemporary variations in democracy. In the 
language of mediation analysis, we regress the outcome Y on predictor X and mediator Z, and 
on the appropriate controls; and the outcome on the predictor, and on the appropriate controls. 
We thereby ascertain whether the predictor and mediator have any effect on the outcome and 
whether the effect of the predictor changes if the mediator is included in a set of covariates. 
 Next, we test H2 to ascertain whether imperial education shaped regional party 
saturation. Therefore, in the second stage of our analysis, we employ party saturation as our 
dependent variable. Our key right hand variable of interest in these regressions is literacy. The 
control variables capture other contemporaneous influences on the supply and demand aspects 
of party saturation. In the language of mediation analysis, we regress the mediator Z on 
predictor X. This is also a crucial stage for ascertaining whether the moderator or the mediator 
model is more appropriate for our analysis. Should we find significant correlation between Z 
and X, we can be confident that the mediation model, which we regard as more appropriate 
given our conceptual framework, is also appropriate from the point of view of data analysis.  
16 
 
 Next, we proceed to the third stage of our analysis to test H3. At this stage we 
compute the direct, the indirect, and the total effects employing the procedures described 
above, and perform sensitivity analysis. Thus, at this stage we perform the mediation analysis, 
while in stages one and two we justify the applicability of the approach. The important 
empirical questions for us are whether the total effect of literacy on democracy remains 
significant and positive once we incorporate the mediating influence of party saturation, and 
how large the decline of the total effect is once party saturation is taken into account. 
In the first stage of our analysis we employ all regions for which data are available and 
exclude those with missing data like Chechnya and the administratively low-ranked 
autonomous okruga. We also exclude Tyva and Kaliningrad, which had not been part of the 
Russian Empire. In the second stage, we exclude all autonomous oblasti and okruga for which 
data are not available. We employ the same set of regions in our third step, since in mediation 
analysis the samples in both the regressions predicting the mediator and the final outcome 
variables should be identical.  
 Table 1 reports the findings from the first stage of analysis. Data for all control  
variables, except for data for the main explanatory variables discussed above—literacy, party 
saturation, and democracy—are obtained either from the official Russian State Statistics 
Service, Rosstat (and averaged over 2000-2004), or from the 2002 Russian State Census. The 
SA S4 contains summary statistics for all the variables. 
 The following control variables are employed. We include measures of income per 
capita and education as proxies for post-communist regional development; these may co-vary 
with democracy.
54
 To account for regional ethnic variations, we include the measure of the 
share of ethnic Russians as a proportion of regional population; we also employ a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if a region has the status of republic and zero otherwise. 
Prior research indicates that ethnically-defined republics and “Russian” regions with oblast 
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status containing large ethnic minority populations tend to score lower on regional democracy 
indices.
55
 Because of the hypothesized links between resource dependence and regime 
variations, we also incorporate the measure of total volume of regional oil and gas 
extraction
56
; we take the logarithm of this value plus one (to keep regions with zero oil and 
gas extraction in our sample) to reduce the impact of outliers. Finally, we control for 
geographic distance in kilometers between regional capitals and Moscow. This variable 
captures possible variations in the intensity of federal control over distant territories; and the 
heterogeneity of regional population preferences, which could also have an impact on regional 
politics. 
 
[Table 1] 
 
 Table 1 presents the results for the first set of (eight) regressions. The first four models 
include only literacy, that is, they regress the outcome Y on the predictor X; the next four 
models include both the literacy and party saturation variables (regression of Y on X and Z). 
In each set of the four models, the first is the baseline model; the second and the third models 
drop either the republic or the Russians variables to deal with possible multicollinearity; the 
last model replaces the 2000-2004 democracy with the 1991-2001 democracy measure.
57
  
The results for our key variables are consistent across the various specifications. 
Regions with legacies of comparatively advanced literacy have significantly higher 
democracy scores. When we exclude party saturation, an increase of 1 percent point in 
literacy increases democracy values by on average 0.15 points. When we include party 
saturation, a 1 percent point increase in literacy results in an over 0.3 point increase in 
democracy. Thus, in line with the mediation assumption, controlling for party saturation 
consistently changes the effect of literacy. In fact, in line with our reasoning, if we block the 
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path from pre-communist education to post-communist democracy through party saturation 
(by controlling for this variable), we obtain a larger ceteris paribus effect of pre-communist 
literacy. The effects for the 1990s are almost identical to those for the 2000s. At the same 
time, we find that party saturation has a significant negative effect on democracy. A 1 
percentage point increase in party membership has the effect of a reduction in the regional 
democracy score of 2.5 points. We perform additional robustness checks (SA S5) and obtain 
similar results.  
 We now move to the second stage of our analysis, to test for the effects of literacy on 
party saturation. Control variables capturing additional factors potentially affecting the 
supply and demand side of party membership in the 1970s are also included. Specifically, we 
control for population size and urbanization. Larger urbanized regions might have been 
prioritized in national planning, while also being desirable places of residence.
58
 We also 
include a dummy variable for regions located on the USSR’s external borders. Strategically 
important frontier regions tended to house military bases; many career military officers also 
resided in these areas. Prior research indicates that joining the CPSU was particularly “easy” 
for military personnel.
59
 We also include a dummy variable that takes the value of one for 
regions with ethnic groups that suffered repression and re-settlement under Stalin, and zero 
otherwise.
60
 The record of repressions may have limited the demand for party membership, 
while the soviet leadership might have also discriminated against repressed groups when 
reviewing membership applications.
61
 We also employ alternative operationalizations of the 
legacy of repressions (SA S5). Because low party membership was generally characteristic of 
ethnic minorities, we include a control variable of population share of ethnic Russians in 
1979. Considering that regional income, which might serve as a proxy for overall well-being, 
might co-vary with career choices and progression,
62
 it is also important for us to capture the 
effects of this variable. Unfortunately, Soviet statistical compilations did not report regional 
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income data. They provide information on average salaries, but in a planned economy 
monetary salary constitutes an imperfect proxy of well-being. A large proportion of revenue 
had been redistributed in material form such as privileged access to consumption goods and 
services. We include a control for 1975 income in one of the specifications. In another model 
we employ the best available proxy for Soviet-era well-being, infant mortality in 1970.
63
 As 
part of our robustness checks (SA S5) other indicators of well-being are also employed. We 
also control for communist education using the measure of share of population with university 
degrees in 1979. Including this variable allows us to disentangle the effects of pre-communist 
and communist, respectively, education legacies. Communist and pre-communist education 
may co-vary, so we exclude communist education in model 2. The results are reported in 
Table 2. 
 
[Table 2] 
 
 The results indicate a statistically significant positive correlation between literacy and 
party saturation, confirming the presence of the hypothesized appropriation mechanism. A 1 
percentage point increase in the share of literates in the late 19
th
 century leads to an increase 
in party saturation of 0.075–0.110 percentage points. We also find urbanization to be 
associated with lower party saturation in one of the models, but only after we include the 
communist education variable in the regressions. Larger population size is also associated 
with lower party saturation levels. Repressions have a negative and significant effect in one of 
the specifications. Infant mortality is negatively associated with party saturation. We also find 
that “Russian” oblasti had on average high party saturation levels. These results are robust to 
additional checks (SA S5). The key finding from these regressions is that pre-communist 
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literacy has a significant positive effect on party saturation—that is, X is a significant 
predictor for Z. 
 We now present results of mediation analysis (third stage). As noted above, literacy is 
employed as a treatment, party saturation as the mediator, and democracy as the outcome 
variable. Control variables are included in specifications (1) of Tables 1 and 2. For the 
estimated direct effect, the total effect, and the mediation effect, we report the 95 percent 
confidence intervals to establish the significance of the results. Table 3 provides the results 
for the aggregated democracy score and for each of its sub-components. The mediation effect 
is, as expected, negative and equal to -0.211; the direct effect is positive and equal to 0.336. 
Both effects are significant at the 5 percent level. Thus, literacy has a positive direct effect, 
and a negative indirect effect going through the mechanism of party saturation, on 
democracy. The total effect is the sum of these two effects; it is not significantly different 
from zero. This is in line with H3. We find a large, positive and significant direct effect of 
pre-communist literacy on regional democracy. This result, however, is almost entirely offset 
by the large, negative and significant effect of communist legacies of party saturation. 
Specifically, a 1 percentage point increase in literacy in the baseline specification reduces 
democracy by 0.21 points through an indirect effect—that is, through party saturation—, 
while simultaneously increasing democracy by 0.36 points through a direct positive effect. 
Our findings are robust to most of the alternative specifications (SA S5), thereby confirming 
the hypothesized appropriation and subversion mechanism accounting for regional 
democratic variations. We also show that outliers have no impact on our results (SA S6); and 
that they hold when individual components of the democracy index are employed (SA S7). 
 
[Table 3] 
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 To further nuance our analysis, we created a typology of regions corresponding to the 
hypothesised appropriation and subversion patterns; and those that deviate from the “norm” 
and therefore warrant additional tests to ascertain what variables might account for these 
“anomalous” patterns (Table 4). Type 1 and 2 regions are representative of the appropriation 
patterns uncovered in our study, namely of the co-variance between literacy and party 
saturation. Type 1 regions featuring high literacy and high party saturation include the 
developed Central Russia and Volga basin territories like Ryazan, Samara, and Saratov; and 
the Far Eastern territories of Khabarovsk and Primorskiy. The Type 2 regions featuring 
comparatively low literacy and low party saturation encompass the less developed Central 
Russia and Volga basin territories; and several “ethnic” republics. Out of our seventy seven 
regions, sixty—the vast majority— belong to these two types (for a visual representation of 
this pattern, see SA S8). 
 Type 3 and 4 regions do not correspond to the general pattern uncovered in our study: 
some high literacy regions feature comparatively low party saturation (Type 3), while some 
regions with comparatively low literacy are characterized by relatively high levels of party 
saturation (Type 4). Examples of the very few regions corresponding to Type 3 are Karelia 
and Nizhniy Novgorod. Type 4 features rural Black Earth regions and several Central Russian 
provinces. Note that in the low literacy Types 2 and 4 regions, higher levels of party 
saturation appear to suppress democracy ratings even further than what we would expect if we 
looked solely at these regions’ imperial literacy statistics. A comparison of outcomes in Type 
1 and 3 regions also indicates that greater party saturation appears to negatively affect 
democratic performance in regions with comparatively high levels of imperial literacy. As 
such, the “anomalous cases” corroborate the hypothesized negative effects of party saturation 
on democracy—the subversion part of our argument. We also perform supplementary analysis 
to further ascertain factors accounting for deviations from expected party saturation levels 
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(SA S9); and to establish whether in “deviating” regions party membership may also 
moderate (in what would be different from a mediating effect) past literacy legacies (SA 
S10). 
 
Appropriation and Subversion Unpacked 
What are the precise causal mechanisms accounting for the observed appropriation and 
subversion patterns? How can we explain the apparent inter-temporal reproduction of past 
human capital effects in Russia’s regions given the known record of post-revolutionary 
exodus of the intelligentsia; the class-based witch-hunt against non-proletarian cadre; and 
Stalinist purges? And how do we account for the apparently detrimental implications of party 
saturation for regional democracy? To address these questions, we here provide an historical 
discussion of the role of education in the Bolsheviks’ recruitment strategies; and of the 
mechanisms linking party saturation and poor regional democratic performance. This account 
is supplemented with an illustrative case study of Ivanovo, a region typifying the 
appropriation and subversion patterns. 
 The link between education and party recruitment became evident early on, from the 
very first days of Bolshevik rule; and it persisted, in fact becoming more pronounced, over 
time.
64
 It is well-known that the Revolution led to an exodus of the—highly educated—upper 
echelons of Tsarist society. Nevertheless, many privileged families remained in Russia, as did 
scores of the literate upwardly mobile citizens of the lower estates. Modernization 
scholarship
65
 would lead us to expect that the relatively enlightened strata that did remain in 
Russia after 1917 would have constituted the pillars of a future democratic society. This 
expectation is supported when we look at regional voting results during Imperial Russia’s 
haphazard experiments with parliamentary democracy in 1906-1917. The electoral records 
indicate that the more literate gubernii tended to elect parliamentarians from the party that 
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best represented a democratic choice—the Constitutional Democratic Party (kadety).66 Why, 
then, did the comparatively well-educated strata flock into the Bolshevik party after 1917? 
Admittedly, many among the service professionals and intelligentsia, not to mention the 
nobility, deplored the new regime. Yet, substantial numbers from even among the more 
privileged groups were genuinely drawn to the Bolsheviks’ socially progressive, “modern” 
message.
67
 Scores among middle class professionals—in a sentiment epitomized in Boris 
Pasternak’s novel Doctor Zhivago—were simply eager to get on with normal lives in a 
country that they loved and that desperately needed their skills. For many—including the 
upwardly mobile peasants engaged in “bourgeois” occupations—, party membership had 
come to represent survival and a way to instrumentally conceal tarnished pasts.
68
 Soviet 
archives from the 1920s are replete with records of passport fraud, appeals against 
“bourgeois” social labelling, or the acquisition of temporary status as factory worker—so as 
to acquire income, social mobility, and basic dignity under the Leninist regime.
69
  
 What did it mean to have a “comparative” educational advantage in post-
Revolutionary Russia? How did the party members’ educational credentials compare to those 
of the society at large? And to what extent did these credentials reflect pre-Revolutionary 
social stratification? On the eve of the Revolution, only 40 percent of population aged over 
eight was literate.
70
 The 1926 census revealed that one out of two Soviet citizens aged over 
eight remained illiterate. A 1911 survey showed that only 44.2 percent of the Empire’s 8-11 
year olds were enrolled in primary schools.
71
 By contrast, in 1919, the level of illiteracy 
among party members was roughly 3 percent; 92 percent had completed at least four years of 
formal schooling.
72
 Although roughly 7 percent of party members had completed ten years of 
secondary schooling or higher education, “this was still some 20-30 times the percentage in 
the population at large.”73 As T.H. Rigby notes, the party “was [thus] an essentially literate 
organization functioning in a semiliterate society.”74  
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 Not only was there a “significant correlation between literacy and party 
membership…, [but] both variables also correlate[ed] positively with a third—upward 
occupational mobility.”75 On the eve of the Revolution, education credentials largely 
continued to mirror Peter the Great’s 18th Century estates system. The estates distinguished 
between peasants; townsmen (meshchane); nobility; clergy; merchants; the educated non-
nobles (raznochintsy); and “others.”76 The nobility and clergy estates predominated among 
recipients of secondary and post-secondary education. By contrast, the education of the 
peasant estate was patchy and largely limited to rural primary schooling. Nevertheless, 
Russia’s 19th century education reforms contributed to the gradual accumulation of peasant 
human capital and acquisition of white-collar occupations.
77
 Clearly, the estates inadequately 
reflected the turn-of-the-century industrialization, urbanization, and social mobility 
processes.
78
 Rigby’s analysis of pre-Revolutionary backgrounds of provincial soviet officials 
provides some indication as to the estate origins of party members.
79
 Nearly a quarter of 
senior Soviet provincial officials in 1921 reportedly occupied positions in tsarist government 
or private bureaucracies and are therefore likely to have hailed from the relatively privileged 
estates. Another large category of new party recruits did come from the lowest—peasant—
estate. However, these “peasant” recruits tended to have already held non-manual jobs, such 
as “petty functionary” by 1914, “thus showing themselves to have already been upwardly 
mobile under the old order.”80 (Additional data on party members’ imperial backgrounds is 
presented in SA S11).  
 There was apparently a systematic urban-rural dimension to the way in which imperial 
social and educational stratification was reproduced among party entrants. Depending on the 
level of administrative authority, both the tsarist professionals—, that is, those with secondary 
and higher education credentials—and the upwardly mobile literates of peasant origin with 
four years of primary schooling—, would have been advantaged in the process.81 Our literacy 
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statistics capture the combined size of these different strata. Georgi Derluguian notes that in 
some national republic centres, the “intellectual capital” through the decades of Soviet rule 
remained concentrated among “old families that could be traced back to the pre-communist 
gentry, bourgeoisie, and intelligentsia.”82 We also know that the imperial intellectual elite—
often of noble origin—under the Bolshevik regime continued to staff prestigious academic 
institutions like the Russian Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg.
83
 Such a significant 
concentration of high-status imperial elite is unlikely to have been the feature of provincial 
capitals of the RSFSR’s regions. In the early 1920s, tsarist civil servants, and those engaged 
in “middling” professions requiring at least secondary education of the meshchane or 
raznochintsy estates, such as teacher, doctor, journalist, or statistician, were apparently 
advantaged in party recruitment in guberniya capitals. At the lower, uezd, territorial level, 
corresponding to small towns and villages, the party tended to recruit larger numbers of those 
listed in imperial censuses as “peasants.”84 As noted above, the “peasant” category often 
included the literate urban and rural white-collar stratum.  
 The skills of the privileged elite and professionals; and of the literate “middling” strata 
of more humble origin were in high demand for the simple reason that the regime set itself the 
goal of rapid modernization of a backward semi-literate country. Yet, the party’s recruitment 
of the latter, “middling” sort of upwardly mobile individuals is particularly important for our 
story, so we discuss it here at some length. The Soviet regime claimed that in the 1920s and 
1930s it rapidly transformed the lowest social strata like factory workers and illiterate 
peasants into the “new soviet-trained intelligentsia”85 (as distinct from the old intelligentsia of 
noble or otherwise privileged origin). Over time, the simple criterion for assigning the 
intelligentsia label became current occupation of a non-manual job. It was often employed 
interchangeably (and inconsistently) with sluzhashchie, though “intelligentsia” tended to refer 
to writers, teachers, doctors, lawyers, statisticians, technicians; and sluzhashchie (officials; 
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office workers)—to clerical workers.86 To counter the claim that imperial human capital 
played no role in the Bolsheviks’ cultivation of the strata that will end up colonizing the 
CPSU, we here unpack the process of the genesis of this new Soviet intelligentsia using the 
example of education policy. In their drive to bring education to the illiterate masses, the 
Bolsheviks faced significant challenges in finding appropriately educated educators. Scores 
of teacher training courses were set up to address the shortage of teachers and lecturers with 
appropriate qualifications. An analysis of teacher training in the Middle Volga gubernii in the 
1920s reveals that these “red teachers” (krasnye uchitelya) were required to possess at least 
secondary education and prior experience of teaching.
87
 In Penza, 31.1 percent of teachers—
the largest category—possessed imperial gymnasia certificates; others had been educated in 
teacher seminaries, other religious schools, and in tsarist secondary and vocational training 
institutions.
88
 While many of these teachers hailed from the privileged estates, others did not 
have trouble passing the ideological bar of “humble” origins. By 1917, the provincial 
education sector had come to be dominated by two estates: the meshchane and “peasants.” 
Historically, it was typical for meshchane to pursue white-collar professions. By contrast, the 
“peasants” had been transitioning into non-manual occupations as part of more recent, 
bottom-up, modernization processes in the countryside. These processes however spanned 
several decades, beginning with peasant emancipation in 1861.
89
 What Soviet propaganda 
tended to obscure is that it is such representatives of the lower estates—largely trained for, 
and socialized in, white-collar occupations under the old regime—that will make the quick 
leap into the status of “new soviet-trained intelligentsia.” The regime could not create this 
“intelligentsia” from scratch, in a top-down fashion, and virtually overnight even if it wanted 
to.  
 We observe substantial regional variations in the extent to which such opportunities 
for appropriation of both the would-be new and the old intelligentsia presented themselves to 
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the Bolsheviks. Certain gubernii in Central Russia, the Middle Volga, Urals, and Western 
Siberia had become by the end of the 19
th
 century hubs of industry and manufacturing, 
spurring the process of movement of peasants to cities. These processes also affected the 
supply-and-demand aspects of education.
90
 Many peasants-turned factory workers and -white 
collar clerks were eager to acquire literacy and numeracy essential for success in the new 
economy; industry owners also had incentives to set up factory schools to increase labor 
productivity. Historically, in a trend that predates Russia’s industrialization, the provision of 
secondary schooling also varied. The Middle Volga cities of Saratov and Samara for instance 
boasted prestigious gymnasia founded by German colonists who settled in Russia in the 18
th
 
century.
91
 Some gubernii also possessed universities like the Kazan Imperial University; the 
Samara Teacher Training Institute; and the Imperial Saratov University, founded in 1804, 
1911, and 1909, respectively (and still existing under modified name and structure). Not only 
did the Bolsheviks eagerly appropriate the infrastructure of these establishments, but they also 
relied on existing faculty to provide instruction in them.
92
 By contrast, party records from the 
less developed areas convey the Bolsheviks’ sense of desperation in finding cadre from 
among the “culturally”- or otherwise -“backward” groups with literacy rates in the single 
digits.
93
 
 Throughout the 1920s, and in particular towards the end of the decade, in 1928-1929, 
the regime made active efforts to secure a more robust representation in the party of those 
actually engaged in farm and factory labor. It did not take long however for the Bolsheviks to 
realize the adverse implications of the marginalization of skilled individuals engaged in non-
manual occupations for the fulfillment of the regime’s ambitious developmental goals. 
Following the disappointing results of the first Five Year Plan (1928-1932), with its high 
labor turnover and low productivity, Stalin proclaimed: “No working class in history had 
managed without its own intelligentsia.” Stalin’s speech was part of a carefully orchestrated 
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attack on “equality mongering”; it represented a turning point in the party’s relaxation of 
class-based recruitment criteria.
94
 To what extent did Stalin’s subsequent purges put a break 
on the recruitment of cadre with human capital advantages acquired during the tsarist order? 
In the Appendix (SA S12), we discuss recent historiography on the purges and the toll that 
they took on party cadre and wider society. Nevertheless, we also provide evidence of the 
reproduction of provincial educated cadre as the purges subsided.
95
 Supplementary statistical 
analysis incorporating the effects of repressions against particular ethnic groups also confirms 
the robustness of our findings (SA S5).  
   While we are able to establish patterns of reproduction of the imperial-era’s better-
educated strata in the party in the 1920s-1930s, no comparable statistics on pre-Revolutionary 
backgrounds of party recruits exist for later time periods; from the late 1930s, party records 
started to feature exclusively soviet class and occupational labels like intelligentsia, worker, 
kolkhoznik.
96
 To better understand patterns of reproduction of human capital in party 
recruitment, we here discuss the wider processes of inter-generational transmission of social 
and educational advantage in soviet society. Most scholars accept that the Soviet 
modernization project did succeed in socially elevating large numbers of individuals of 
modest origin.
97
 Nevertheless, research on communist social stratification has found a greater 
degree of continuity in the intergenerational transmission of preference for higher education 
among white-collar strata than among manual workers. Thus, both in the USSR
98
 and 
Hungary,
99
 children of manual workers elevated to white-collar status often reverted to 
“proletarian” occupations or became college drop-outs thus putting a break on Soviet-
engineered processes of social mobility. By contrast, those born to parents with white-collar 
occupations were far more likely to complete higher education.
100
 In the Institute of Red 
Professors—the academy meant to train ideologically robust cadre—, in 1921-1930, the 
majority of students commandeered from “peasant” and “proletarian” jobs ended up being 
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among the ranks of some 90 percent (!) drop-outs from the course. By contrast, it is students 
with “non-proletarian” backgrounds who tended to persevere in completing it.101 Inkeles 
notes: “It is certainly not accidental that since 1938 the Soviet Union has not published 
statistics on the social composition of the student body in higher educational institutions, 
since at that time. . . it was already true that the children of the intelligentsia and employees 
constituted 47 per cent of the student body although the group made up only some 17 per cent 
of the total population.”102 Clearly, parental values help explain the intergenerational 
transmission of cultural capital much like they would in other contexts.
103
 State policy 
however also shaped social mobility in ways that went against official ideology. In 1922, to 
stem the tide of peasants moving into cities, the Bolsheviks instituted the propiska system of 
residential registration, thereby tying rural populations to collective farms.
104
 The introduction 
in 1932 of a “social position” (worker, kolkhoznik) entry in passports, served to further 
rigidify class distinctions in society.
105
 The tuition fees instituted between 1940 and 1956 for 
secondary and higher education were prohibitive for many manual workers.
106
  
 In turn, party membership helped reproduce education and status inequalities insofar 
as it conferred social advantages like access to good schools, elite holiday camps, and scarce 
material goods.
107
 Rigby argues that CPSU had come to embody the Soviet elite, though “an 
elite of a rather peculiar kind: one in which representation is ensured for all major segments of 
Soviet society. . . and at all levels of employment.”108 Early on, however, we observe a form 
of “reciprocal representation between the CPSU membership and those categories of Soviet 
citizens who prima facie stand high with respect to prestige, remuneration or power (emphasis 
original).” Thus, in 1959, “the chances of a white-collar worker [entering the party] were six 
or seven times as great” 109 as that of a collective farmer. We also know that father’s education 
and prestige of occupation positively correlated with party recruitment.
110
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 We now turn to unpacking the mechanisms accounting for the subversion patterns 
uncovered in our statistical analysis. As already noted, our party data encompass officials 
working in party and soviet structures; and “lay” members in various other occupations. Prior 
scholarship helps illuminate how both of these sets of actors might have a bearing on regional 
democratic outcomes. Specifically, we distinguish between (1) political elite and bureaucracy 
theorizing on the governance effects of reproduction of communist-era leadership and street-
level functionaries; and theorizing on the (1) societal effects of party saturation, specifically 
those related to individual values and behavior.
111
 
 One simple way of conceptualizing the influence of party functionaries on governance 
is in terms of their “know-how”—their values and modi operandi. Prior research found a 
considerable degree of reproduction of party apparatchiki in post-communist regional power 
structures; furthermore, many had commenced their careers as early as the 1970s.
112
 As 
Gerald Easter discusses, Brezhnev’s stability of cadre policy from the 1960s onwards ensured 
a high degree of regional bureaucratic continuity.
113
 Joel Moses found that by the 1980s, those 
born in the region or those who had spent a considerable time working there were much more 
likely to staff regional party and soviet bodies than non-natives.
114
 The policy helped nurture 
entrenched cliques of regional bosses who used their positions to dish out patronage to 
supporters and penalize dissenters. These features of governance characteristic of many 
clientelistic settings
115
 overlapped with the soviet model of “democratic centralism” and 
expectation of bureaucratic and societal compliance with town-down decision making. To use 
Grzymala-Busse’s apt term, these are the kinds of “usable pasts” that regional party 
functionaries would apply to post-soviet governance.
116
 Gorbachev’s perestroika may have 
generated nascent shoots of other potentially usable pasts—those of merit in recruitment, 
accommodation with civil society, and tolerance of dissent. Yet, we know that regional 
cliques were often successful at resisting Gorbachev’s attempts to break their power.117 
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Another by-product of the reproduction of cadre in regional power structures is control over 
key regional resources. Regional functionaries were often trained in local institutes that 
prepared competent cadre for specific regional industries. They also frequently moved 
between regional party and soviet work and managerial roles in local enterprises. In the post-
soviet period, not only were these local bosses in an excellent position to re-colonize regional 
governments, but—because of their industry know-how and contacts—to control the process 
of privatization of enterprises. Access to industry resources coupled with positions in regional 
governments would in turn facilitate the construction of powerful political machines. 
 Our second suggested causal mechanism linking party saturation to poor democratic 
outcomes relates to value orientations and behavior of “lay” members. These rank-and-file 
members may have pursued occupations unrelated to careers in the party apparat. As party 
ticket holders, however, they would have received greater exposure to routinized forms of 
political participation than non-members. In fact, activism in official youth groups like the 
Komsomol was sine qua non for party admission. Public opinion surveys have shown that 
former party members are less likely to espouse democratic values than non-members.
118
 
Clearly, while many had to feign enthusiasm for communism to join the party and thereby 
secure a promotion, others appear to have actually internalized the regime values. 
Socialization in “compliant political activism”119 is in turn likely to be among the societal 
pasts accounting for lack of civic activism in Russia’s less democratic regions.120 Party 
saturation might also indirectly affect the viability and strength of autonomous organizations 
in society.
121
 In regions with large numbers of party cadre, we would expect high levels of 
both self-policing and societal policing of mezzo-structures that might articulate oppositional 
interests.
122
 Our supplementary statistical analysis (SA S13) provides further support for the 
hypothesized bureaucracy and societal channels. 
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Ivanovo: A Typical Case 
The Ivanovo region typifies the appropriation and subversion patterns uncovered in our study. 
As such, it further illuminates the above-discussed mechanisms linking imperial literacy, 
party saturation, and democracy. Ivanovo is a small region on the Volga River located North-
east of Moscow, with a population of about 1,255.5 people.
123
 In the Imperial period, present-
day Ivanovo had been part of the Ivanovo-Voznesenskiy Industrial District, which covered 
Vladimir and Kostroma gubernii. Ivanovo city was founded in 1871 when the Ivanovo 
village, which specialised in textile artisanry, was merged with the textile industry town of 
Voznesensk. Ivanovo’s soil conditions were unfavourable for the development of agriculture. 
As in other such regions, many peasants engaged in trades that facilitated the development of 
manufacturing and commerce. By the end of the 19
th
 century, Ivanovo-Voznesensk became 
“the Manchester of Russia,” famed for textile manufacturing. Industrialization went hand in 
hand with human capital development. The Vladimir guberniya, of which Ivanovo formed 
part, featured among Russia’s “leaders in primary education.”124 As in the other modernizing 
regions, the new bourgeoisie—epitomised by the Garelin dynasty of textile magnates—took 
pride in civic activism and philanthropy (metsenatstvo). In 1847, Yakov Petrovich Gerelin 
(1820-1890) became Mayor of Ivano-Voznesensk. In addition to opening a school for his 
factory workers, he founded a public library, a public hospital, a school for boys, and a 
gymnasium for girls.
125
  
 The fate of two institutions: the gymnasium for girls (now a high school specialising in 
English language); and the Ivanovo Polytechnic Institute, illustrates the typical pattern of 
appropriation—and subversion—that unfolded to a greater or lesser extent across Russia after 
the Bolsheviks took power. The gymnasium had been founded in 1878. The school 
curriculum covered seven years of instruction; a special 8
th
 grade was optional for girls 
aspiring to become teachers. In 1918, the Bolsheviks turned the gymnasium into a co-ed 
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school and retained the imperial teaching staff.
126
 Some of the school’s imperial-era female 
alumni subsequently became prominent oblast party workers.
127
 The regional party boss 
(1972-1985) Vladimir Kluev hailed form the school; as did one of the heads of oblast 
administration in the 1990s, Adolf Laptev.
128
 The Riga Polytechnic Institute, founded in 1862 
and evacuated to Ivanovo during World War I, represented the Bolsheviks’ another 
appropriation of an imperial institution. In 1930, the Polytechnic’s departments were 
expanded to form the Agricultural; Chemistry; Textile; and Energy Institutes.
129
 Among the 
Institute’s appropriated faculty was Vsevolod Keldysh, a noble. His son, Mstislav Keldysh, 
the feted soviet academician, studied in the Ivanovo gymnasium.  
 The Bolsheviks built on Ivanovo’s industrial heritage, turning it into a textile 
production centre of USSR-wide significance. Throughout the Soviet decades, the imperial 
educational establishments served as training platforms for local cadre that would be engaged 
in Ivanovo’s textile industries and party work. Leading experts on Russia’s regional politics 
have characterised Ivanovo’s post-communist development in terms of a strong degree of 
cadre, policy and political continuity with the communist period. Ivanovo’s “polnovlastnyy 
khozyain” (whole-scale owner) between 1972 and the onset of perestroika in 1985, a “tough 
party apparatchik of the old-fashioned mould,” had been a native of the region with strong ties 
to the textile industry.
130
 An outsider appointed to run the oblast in 1985 did not last very long 
as he appeared “soft” and “moderate” compared to his native predecessor. By 1990, Ivanovo 
was back in the hands of native nomenklaturshiki, who had cut their teeth as professionals and 
managers in the textile industry and party work. The pliant regional legislative council had 
come to be packed with industry directors—in the mid 1990s constituting some 50 percent of 
the deputy ranks; and heads of local administrations—some 25 percent.131 Even against the 
background of national-level democratic politics of the early 1990s, Ivanovo continued to 
feature communist-era functionaries at the helm of power. For instance, the governor 
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Vladislav Tihomirov had previously served as Chairman and First secretary of the oblast’s 
party executive committee.
132
 In 2000, Tikhomirov was succeeded by another regional 
insider, Vladimir Tikhonov, a formerly high-ranking party functionary and manager of one of 
Ivanovo’s largest textile enterprise, Shuyskie sitsy. Tikhonov was among the few regional 
bosses bold enough to protest President Putin’s policy of appointing governors in the mid-
2000s. So entrenched was his power that—in a case covered in the national press—the 
Kremlin resorted to dispatching FSB officers to depose him. He was eventually forced to sign 
his resignation papers in bed, in Ivanovo’s neurological hospital.133 
 In the post-communist period, Ivanovo’s entrenched networks of party officials, who 
had made their careers moving between positions as enterprise managers and raykom and 
obkom party bureau chiefs, turned into effective political machines. Former Communist 
bosses continued to maintain soviet-era styles of centralised decision making, for instance 
requiring the participation of regional executives in trade deals involving local textile 
companies.
134
 The strong ties between regional leaders and industry served to lubricate these 
machines and to crowd out political dissent. Thus, enterprise managers refrained from 
financially supporting opposition groups, while also ensuring the political docility of 
enterprise employees by threatening punitive measures should they not vote as instructed. 
Independent media outlets like the Ivanovo Press newspaper reported being threatened with 
lawsuits by Tikhonov for publishing material critical of regional officials. Independent media 
critical of regional government also complained that they receive no sponsorship from textile 
companies considering the latter’s strong ties to regional bosses.135  
 Soviet-style co-optation of society and workforce into quasi-official organizations and 
ritualised forms of “participation” in governance had been also widespread. During 
perestroika, when such practices were already scorned upon, Ivanovo became notorious for 
delegating its textile workers to sit on official party and soviet congresses and meetings, 
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thereby “symbolizing the participation of workers in the management of the state.”136 
Ivanovo’s citizen passivity remained a consistent feature of its political landscape. Even at the 
height of political upheaval in Russia, in 2011-2012, when thousands of protesters took to the 
streets in anti-regime protests in many regions, an opposition website tracking social activism 
in Russia’s regions (namarsh.ru) recorded only one protest for Ivanovo.137 
   
Discussion 
The preceding analysis has highlighted how pre-communist education can paradoxically 
contribute to the subversion of regional democratic potential. Our paper supports earlier 
research indicating a positive association between pre-communist literacy and post-
communist democracy. Yet, we also find that the effect of pre-communist literacy is mediated 
by communist party recruitment. The communists tended to be more likely to be recruited in 
areas that had been better developed at the time of the imposition of Bolshevik rule. We 
explained these patterns with reference to the higher human capital of the more developed 
areas; these areas could supply larger numbers of recruits to the regime desperate to get itself 
up and running. These party recruits and their descendants were engaged in the collective 
effort to promote the USSR’s top-down modernization drive. As the system matured, they 
became progressively devoid of the values that classic modernization theorists associate with 
bottom-up modernization processes. Not all of the developed locales of course suffered the 
fate of being cannibalized by the party. Some of the historically developed regions had 
comparatively low levels of party saturation.
138
  
 Our study nuances earlier scholarship on the links between pre-communist literacy and 
post-communist political regime variations. We find that literacy matters even outside of the 
contexts where it could proxy for institutional autonomy to develop curricula inculcating 
children with nationalist myths and particular cultural values.
139
 Our analysis of Russia points 
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to a more straightforward modernization explanation: even absent nationalist curricula in 
minority areas, and even in the context of an absolutist monarchy, literacy can help kick-start 
a bundle of socio-economic processes and value orientations that can survive the socially-
homogenizing communist experiment. We also find, contra Pop-Eleches and Tucker,
140
 that 
education obtained before communism may not always serve to promote resistance to 
authoritarianism. Instead, it could endow the better-educated strata with a survival edge under 
the new regime and with enhanced opportunities to cement it.  
 Scope conditions of course have to be carefully considered when postulating the 
external validity of our findings.
141
 These scope restrictions in particular apply to our first 
causal claim—appropriation. Among Soviet puppet regimes in Europe, one does encounter 
many a “fervent communist[s] who played a key role in establishing communist rule.”142 In 
Hungary, the relatively benign regime installed after the 1956 uprising even enjoyed a degree 
of genuine popular appeal.
143
 Nevertheless, whether communism had been home-grown or 
represented “an alien, inferior imposition by a suspect regional superpower”144 is bound to 
have mattered for social receptivity to communist dogma.  
 We also ought to be sensitive to variations in pre-communist legacies among 
communist states. Pre-communist national identities, civic consciousness, societal 
organization, and other variables that could be linked to the political-cultural aspects of the 
reproduction of legacies; and the peculiarities of political, economic, and religious 
institutions, are likely to have influenced the extent to which the better-educated strata could 
be appropriated by communist rulers.
145
 These legacies also likely affected the bargaining 
strength of individuals and groups as they negotiated their social position in the new order.
146
 
Furthermore, East-West developmental variations conditioned over centuries by proximity to 
centers of trade and growth
147
 and by more recent 20
th
 century processes of 
Europeanisation
148
 also matter. These variations may have well determined whether 
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communism would be regarded in a positive light among potential converts to Marxist-
Leninist faith or invidiously compared with the developmental fruits in the capitalist West.
149
  
 The temporal scope of communism is also likely to have mattered for societal 
incentives to be appropriated by the new regime.
150
 By the 1950s, even the true believers—as 
epitomized by the Yugoslav communist Milovan Djilas—were having their misgivings about 
Stalinist rule.
151
 For those who joined the party not as an act of faith, but as a means of career 
advancement, the relaxation of the totality of state rule over society following de-Stalinization 
also perhaps meant a relaxation of incentives to blend into the regime. Yet, we also know that 
some degree of opportunism in party applications, particularly among the better educated, had 
been present in Soviet satellite states throughout the decades of communist rule. As Pop-
Eleches notes in discussing communist legacies in Europe, “while Party membership itself 
was not mandatory, it was nevertheless a crucial precondition for many professional careers 
and was therefore much more frequent among university graduates.
152
 Although a number of 
caveats are in order when applying our analysis to other settings, clearly, appropriation should 
be considered alongside other “shared” features of communism.153  
 When it comes to the subversion component of our argument, recent scholarship 
makes us even more confident in extending our findings to other post-communist countries, 
though here too important qualifiers apply. Studies have found that the length of communist 
rule matters for the propensity of the general citizenry to embrace democracy.
154
 As Herbert 
Kitschelt notes, in states where communism spanned only two generations, the older 
generation could “draw on skills and experiences never quite lost during communism.”155 
Nevertheless, survey research has revealed that across the universe of post-communist cases, 
educated citizens are far less likely to espouse democratic values than those in societies with 
comparable levels of education that had not experienced communism.
156
 In analyzing 
specifically the links between party membership and post-communist democratic values and 
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practices, Grzymala-Busse rightly argues that we ought to be sensitive to the substantial 
variations among communist countries in ruling party recruitment strategies, policy reform, 
and a record of accommodation with society.
157
 Yet, we also know that there was something 
about the nature of involvement in the activities of official communist organizations that may 
account for the generally less-democratic value orientations of former party cadre in many 
communist settings.
158
  
 Our study is also relevant to historical legacies theorizing going beyond post-
communist contexts. It highlights the importance of studying the incentives, preferences, and 
value orientations of actors transcending the narrow group of top decision makers, but 
nevertheless essential for the survival—or subversion—of a post-critical juncture order. 
While social and educational background and long-term value orientations might be sound 
predictors of preferences and behaviors under a normal political equilibrium, politically and 
socially fluid contexts might lead to a shift in preferences for social and political action 
among particular social strata. So, ours is a plea for the broadening of analytical focus in 
studies of historical watershed events transcending the preoccupation with “key political 
actors” that we discern in Giovanni Capocchia and Daniel Kelemen’s influential paper on 
critical junctures.
159
 Our study also serves as an endorsement of Daniel Ziblatt and Grzegorz 
Ekiert’s point about the need to focus on continuities—in our case in the relative social 
positioning of the literate strata—and the literati—in the pre- and post-critical juncture orders. 
These continuities might be obscured by an exclusive focus on rupture.
160
 We therefore need 
new theory and further empirical work in other contexts. The theory should help further 
illuminate how during regime-transformative critical junctures, citizens’ education credentials 
might help solidify support for an emerging autocratic regime, or help erode the quality of, or 
even subvert, a nascent democratic one, in ways that are at odds with earlier theorizing. This 
is an agenda for future research.  
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1. Determinants of sub-national democracy, OLS 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Democracy 
indicator, period 
2000- 
2004 
2000- 
2004 
2000- 
2004 
1991- 
2001 
2000- 
2004 
2000- 
2004 
2000- 
2004 
1991- 
2001 
Party saturation, 
1970s     -2.428*** -2.385*** -2.587*** -2.679*** 
 
    (0.691) (0.673) (0.695) (0.649) 
Literacy, 1897 0.134* 0.130* 0.166** 0.169** 0.309*** 0.307*** 0.347*** 0.370*** 
 
(0.073) (0.073) (0.079) (0.081) (0.070) (0.070) (0.074) (0.079) 
Education, 2002 0.027 0.019 -0.131 0.078 0.130 0.130 -0.0004 0.153 
 
(0.254) (0.263) (0.291) (0.269) (0.209) (0.205) (0.239) (0.206) 
Income, 2000-
2004  0.321 0.293 0.387 -0.0001 0.758* 0.758* 0.844 0.001 
 
(0.496) (0.511) (0.611) (0.001) (0.414) (0.407) (0.510) (0.001) 
Share of ethnic 
Russians, 2002 0.142** 0.108***  0.179*** 0.124** 0.133*** 
 
0.155*** 
 
(0.054) (0.033)  (0.051) (0.054) (0.032) 
 
(0.052) 
Dummy republic 2.174  -3.821* 4.114 -0.638 
 
-5.994*** 0.929 
 
(2.848)  (1.927) (2.569) (2.784) 
 
(1.764) (2.484) 
Distance from 
Moscow -0.196 -0.216 -0.300 -0.143 -0.267 -0.261 -0.362 -0.221 
 
(0.208) (0.209) (0.209) (0.217) (0.220) (0.215) (0.219) (0.225) 
Log oil and gas 
extraction, 2000-
2004 (measured in 
coal equivalent) 1.122** 1.067** 0.800 0.999** 0.352 0.381 0.024 0.116 
 
(0.506) (0.508) (0.551) (0.497) (0.529) (0.510) (0.553) (0.497) 
Constant 12.994* 16.541*** 27.811*** 8.160 29.167*** 27.921*** 43.008*** 26.769*** 
 
(6.687) (5.214) (3.518) (6.786) (7.919) (5.822) (5.327) (7.824) 
Observations 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 
R-squared 0.324 0.317 0.245 0.344 0.459 0.458 0.399 0.506 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1% level; ** 5%; * 1%. In specification (4) and 
(8) oil and gas extraction and income for 1995-2001. 
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Table 2. Determinants of party saturation (CPSU membership in proportion to regional 
population) in the 1970s, OLS 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Literacy, 1897 0.084*** 0.111*** 0.081*** 0.075*** 
 
(0.019) (0.023) (0.018) (0.019) 
Population, 1977 -0.0003*** -0.0002 -0.0003*** -0.0003*** 
 
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Urbanization, 1977 -0.018 0.005 -0.009 -0.027** 
 
(0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) 
Border region (USSR) -0.263 -0.030 -0.130 -0.284 
 
(0.362) (0.368) (0.371) (0.334) 
Repressed by Stalin -1.160 -0.736 -1.290** -0.416 
 
(0.720) (0.765) (0.609) (0.722) 
Infant mortality, 1970 -0.032 -0.013 
 
0.005 
 
(0.025) (0.030) 
 
(0.028) 
Education, 1979 0.327*** 
 
0.341*** 0.375*** 
 
(0.111) 
 
(0.116) (0.103) 
Monthly salary, 1975  
 
-0.004 
 
 
 
 
(0.004) 
 Share of ethnic Russians, 1979  
  
0.024*** 
 
 
  
(0.006) 
Constant 7.219*** 6.408*** 6.540*** 4.889*** 
 
(0.980) (1.293) (0.729) (1.108) 
Observations 71 71 71 71 
R-squared 0.613 0.515 0.613 0.670 
 Note: See Table 1. 
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Table 3. Mediation analysis, 2000-2004 
Dependent variable Effect Mean 95% confidence interval 
Democracy ACME -0.211 -0.368 -0.087 
 Direct effect 0.336 0.200 0.468 
 Total effect 0.125 -0.033 0.278 
Note: ACME stands for average causal mediation effect. 
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Table 4. Examples of regions with distinct combinations of pre-communist and 
communist legacies and their democracy score 
 
Type 1: 
 
High literacy 
High CPSU member saturation 
 
Average democracy score: 30.2 
Average literacy: 29.3 
Average party saturation: 9.9 
Number of regions: 25 
 
Examples: Ryazan, Saratov, Samara, Tula, 
Tver, Vladimir, Volgograd, Yaroslav, 
Rostov, Novgorod, Ivanovo, Kostroma, 
Kamchatka, Khabarovsk, Primorskiy 
 
Type 2: 
 
Low literacy 
Low CPSU member saturation 
 
Average democracy score: 27.7 
Average literacy: 14.1 
Average party saturation: 7.1 
Number of regions: 35 
 
Examples: Astrakhan, Bashkortostan, 
Belgorod, Krasnodar, Irkutsk 
 
Type 3: 
 
High literacy 
Low CPSU member saturation 
 
Average democracy score: 36.8 
Average literacy: 22.5 
Average party saturation: 7.6 
Number of regions: 6 
 
Examples: Arkhangelsk, Karelia, Komi, 
Chelyabinsk, Nizhniy Novgorod 
 
Type 4: 
 
Low literacy 
High CPSU member saturation 
 
Average democracy score: 26.6 
Average literacy: 16.4 
Average party saturation: 9.0 
Number of regions: 11 
 
Examples: Kaluga, Kursk, Orel, Penza, 
Pskov, Smolensk, Tambov, Ulyanovsk, 
Vologda, Voronezh 
 
Note: Cutoff values are 8.35 percent for party saturation and 20.00 percent for literacy (i.e., the means of both 
variables). 
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 Figure 1: Pre-Communist and Communist Legacies and Democratic Variations  
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SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDIX (FOR PUBLICATION ONLINE) 
 
Appendix S1: Matching imperial gubernii and communist and post-communist Russia’s 
regions 
 
There were forty-six gubernii in tsarist Russia, the territories of which now form part of the 
Russian Federation.  After the Bolshevik Revolution, many gubernii were split into several 
regions. To ensure inter-temporal observational equivalence, if a guberniya had been divided 
into several entities in the post-communist period, the latter were assigned the values of the 
original guberniya. Scholars who have sought to match imperial with communist and post-
communist data estimating the percentage share of imperial regions included in post-
communist administrative territories found the differences to be modest for most regions.  The 
largest differences were in Western Siberia and Ukraine (not part of our study).  We address 
the Siberian data issue by tracing which gubernii had been split into multiple regions.  On 
recent attempts to match regional imperial and communist population statistics, see (Kumo, 
Morinaga et al. 2007). See also (Leasure and Lewis 1966)  
2 
 
Appendix S2: Sensitivity analysis 
 
The results of mediation analysis are sensitive to the sequential ignorability assumption. To 
ascertain the extent to which our estimations would be affected by violations of this 
assumption, we run sensitivity analysis for all of the specifications. Below we report two sets 
of indicators. First, we report a series of graphs, showing how the estimation of the indirect 
effect would change conditional on the rho – a parameter measuring the correlation of error 
terms in the equations employed to perform the analysis. Second, we report the value of rho 
for which the indirect effect would become equal to zero. If rho were close to zero, the results 
would not be very trustworthy: it would mean that if there was an omitted confounding 
variable, which exhibited even a very low level of correlation with the outcome and the 
mediator variables, the mediation effect would actually be zero. In our case, we observe that 
for almost all of the specifications, most of the possible rho values (this indicator, as any 
correlation coefficient, varies between minus one and one) yield a significant and negative 
indirect effect of pre-communist literacy on post-communist democracy through party 
saturation. The rho, for which the indirect effect is equal to zero, mostly varies between -0.5 
and -0.3. It means that one would require omitted confounding variables with relatively high 
effects on both the mediator and the outcome to render the mediation effect equal to zero: this 
is unlikely given the large number of covariates we employed in different specifications to 
check the validity of our results (see also Backer 2015 for a similar discussion of sensitivity 
analysis). Therefore, we can be confident of the validity of our appropriation and subversion 
hypothesized mechanism under a broad set of assumptions. For comparative purposes, note 
that for the baseline specification, the correlation coefficient of the estimated residuals is 
0.016; this value should not be interpreted as a valid statistical test though, since the key 
assumption is not testable. 
 
S2.1: Sensitivity analysis for baseline regressions and robustness checks: effects of rho 
on the predicted mediator effect 
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S2.2: Sensitivity analysis for baseline regressions and robustness checks: effects of rho 
on the predicted mediator effect: the value of rho at which the mediator effect is equal to 
zero 
Specification 
rho, at which  ACME = 
0 
Baseline specification -0.347 
Robustness checks  
Drop 2002 education from the set of control variables -0.348 
Drop 2000-2004 income from the set of control variables -0.333 
Employ monthly salary (1975) as a proxy for Soviet-period 
income 
-0.379 
Employ income per capita (1985) as a proxy for Soviet-
period income 
-0.391 
Employ housing construction per capita as a proxy for 
Soviet-period income 
-0.384 
Employ doctors per capita as a proxy for Soviet-period 
income 
-0.399 
Employ retail trade as a proxy for Soviet-period income  -0.392 
Control for Soviet-period ethnic structure -0.335 
Control for tsarist social structure -0.273 
Control for Soviet population density -0.296 
Control for Soviet industrial structure -0.317 
Employ democracy index, 1991-2001 -0.369 
Control for oil and gas extraction per unit of regional GDP 
in 2000-2004 
-0.370 
Control for the legacy of repression against particular ethnic 
groups by employing the measure of population share of 
these groups instead of employing a regional dummy 
-0.331 
Control for the legacy of repression against particular ethnic 
groups by employing the measure of population share of 
these groups, as well as the share of Jewish population 
-0.332 
Control for the legacy of repression against particular ethnic 
groups by employing a dummy for regions from which 
these ethnic groups had been deported irrespective of 
whether these groups returned to their regions of origin or 
not 
-0.327 
Control for urbanization 2000-2004 -0.344 
Binary treatment -0.288 
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Appendix S3: Components of the democracy index 
 
 Autonomy of municipalities from the regional government; 
 Civil society (strength of non-governmental organizations, opportunities for social 
activism, direct democracy); 
 Corruption (in particular, political corruption, e.g., vote-buying); 
 Economic liberalization (use of economic tools by the incumbent to control the region); 
 Elites (pluralism of elites; mechanisms of power transfer); 
 Free, fair, and competitive elections; 
 Independent media; 
 Regional political openness (political transparency and ease of access for actors from 
outside the region); 
 Political pluralism (presence of stable key parties in the regional legislature); 
 Regional political organization (balance of power and independence of the executive, 
legislative and judicial branches of power, protection of civil rights, electoral 
manipulations, manipulations of appointments). 
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Appendix S4: Summary statistics  
 
Variable Units No.obs. Mean St.dev. Min. Max. 
Coal output (1975) millions of tons 79 4.82 16.83 0.00 137.00 
Democracy (1991-2001) NA 79 27.95 6.23 14.00 45.00 
Democracy (2000-2004) NA 79 29.01 6.28 17.00 45.00 
Democracy (McMann) NA 57 3.77 32.56 -79.00 94.00 
Distance to Helsinki thousands of km 77 2.36 1.82 0.32 7.16 
Distance to Moscow (alternative) thousands of km 79 1.79 1.88 0.00 6.78 
Distance to Moscow (Rosstat) thousands of km 79 2.37 2.75 0.00 11.88 
Doctors per capita (1976) per 10,000 people 73 32.92 10.75 20.90 88.30 
Dummy Islamic region NA 79 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 
Dummy repressed peoples (baseline regression) NA 79 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 
Dummy repressed peoples (including regions to which 
repressed groups did not return) 
NA 
79 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 
Dummy republic (2000s) NA 79 0.25 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Dummy Soviet borders NA 73 0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00 
Education (1979) % 79 6.16 2.35 4.30 19.70 
Education (2002) % 79 17.20 3.61 11.20 35.97 
Fiscal transfers (2000-2004) % 79 27.38 18.52 1.11 79.06 
Housing construction (1976) sq. meters per capita 73 0.43 0.08 0.29 0.72 
Income per capita (1985) RUR 79 2.15 17.85 0.08 158.80 
Income per capita (2000-2004) thousands RUR 79 3.48 1.95 1.13 14.81 
Infant mortality (1970s) NA 79 23.89 4.93 14.80 42.10 
Literacy (1890s)  % 77 20.00 9.78 4.10 62.60 
Log oil and gas (2000-2004) Log (1+ coal equivalent) 79 0.65 1.26 0.00 6.93 
Monthly salary (1975) RUR 79 156.08 53.19 107.00 400.00 
Number of civic protests (2007-2012) NA 77 8.74 12.39 0.00 69.00 
Number of economic protests (2007-2012) NA 77 7.43 8.47 0.00 45.00 
Number of political protests (2007-2012) NA 77 14.05 14.43 0.00 74.00 
Number of social protests (2007-2012) NA 77 8.39 11.89 0.00 69.00 
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Openness to foreign trade % 79 1.43 1.37 0.09 10.95 
Outsiders (1890s) % 77 8.39 3.88 1.40 18.00 
Party saturation (1970s) % 79 8.35 1.58 5.98 15.43 
Peasants (1890s) % 77 76.53 21.41 7.70 97.20 
Petty bourgeoisie (meshchane) (1890s) % 77 6.98 4.19 1.30 22.10 
Population (1977) thousands of people 73 1857.38 1378.13 258.00 7819.00 
Population (2000-2004) thousands of people 79 1820.56 1619.62 53.60 10313.80 
Population density (1977) people per sq. km 71 31.59 38.61 0.30 300.80 
Presidential visits (2000-2004) NA 79 1.75 3.59 0.00 25.00 
Retail trade (1976) thousands RUR per capita 73 0.89 0.22 0.48 1.87 
Share of bureaucrats in the regional population % 79 10.42 5.20 2.88 39.77 
Share of bureaucrats with long tenure % 79 0.40 0.06 0.27 0.57 
Share of ethnic Russians (1979) % 79 78.83 20.71 11.64 98.08 
Share of ethnic Russians (2002) % 79 76.89 23.81 1.19 96.56 
Share of formerly repressed peoples between 0 and 1 79 0.02 0.09 0.00 0.65 
Share of formerly repressed peoples and Jewish 
people 
between 0 and 1 
79 0.03 0.09 0.00 0.65 
Share of Muslims in the regional population (2012)  % 77 5.23 13.36 0.00 83.00 
Share of state-owned enterprises (2000-2004) % 79 15.96 6.26 2.25 38.88 
Steel output (1975) thousands tons 79 1010.65 3403.23 0.00 24777.00 
Social well-being (2007) NA 79 43.44 18.23 1.00 100.00 
Territory (2000s) millions sq. km 79 0.22 0.47 0.00 3.10 
Urbanization (1977) % 73 65.27 13.40 39.00 100.00 
Urbanization (2000-2004) % 79 69.07 12.87 26.06 100.00 
 
Note: oil and gas extraction recomputed in coal equivalent as extraction of oil in the region, millions of tons, * 1.4 plus extraction of gas in the 
region, billions of cubic meters * 1.2 
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Distribution of key variables 
 
Below we report the kernel density estimators for all of the three key variables employed in 
our analysis. The democracy index does not appear to have pronounced outliers: it is hardly 
surprising, since it had been constructed specifically for Russia’s regions. We find that on 
both the literacy and CPSU membership measures however there are a number of outliers. 
The range of literacy in imperial Russia’s gubernii is between 4.1 percent and 62.6 percent, 
but there are only four regions with literacy exceeding 40 percent.  These outlier regions are 
Moscow, St. Petersburg, and regions in the vicinity of the two metropolises. The regional 
party membership share as a proportion of adult population varies between 5.98 percent and 
15.43 percent. Again, there is only one region in which party saturation exceeds 12 percent:  
the City of Moscow; in five regions it is higher than 11 percent: Kaliningrad, Tver, 
Kamchatka, St. Petersburg and Leningradskaya Oblast. The presence of outliers has to be 
taken into account in our econometric models.  In what follows, we therefore perform a 
number of specific tests dealing with the potential influence of outliers on our findings. 
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Appendix S5: Robustness checks 
 
Description of robustness checks  
 
Stage 1 
- We replace distance to Moscow with the variable of distance to Helsinki, capital of the 
closest established West European democracy. Prior research has found that geographic 
proximity to Western Europe might influence the democratic development of Russia’s 
regions. Regions located in greater proximity to the West might receive more EU aid 
aimed at democracy promotion; there may be also other diffusion processes at work 
facilitating “linkages” between Western regions and their democratic counterparts in the 
West (Lankina and Getachew 2006; Lankina and Getachew 2008; Levitsky and Way 
2006). We also run a regression controlling for both distance to Moscow and to Helsinki. 
Distances to Moscow and to Helsinki are highly correlated though (correlation coefficient 
of 0.969). For distance to Moscow we use two proxies: one extracted from the official 
Rosstat publications and one from standard Internet mapping sources; both are highly 
correlated and yield similar results. 
- It is possible that both pre-Soviet and Soviet modernization and contemporary democracy 
are influenced by the significance that the federal center attaches to a particular region. To 
capture this otherwise unobserved characteristic we count how often the region had been 
visited by the federal president in 2000-2004 and add this variable to the set of controls. 
We also replicate the above regressions excluding Krasnodar Krai (the region is known to 
be a favored holiday destination for Russia’s presidents) and St. Petersburg, which are 
visited particularly often by national leaders. 
- Some scholars have posited links between economic statism and democratization (Fish 
2005). We capture the potential economic statism effect by employing the measure of the 
share of state-owned enterprises in the total number of enterprises in the region and add 
this control to the set of covariates. 
- Considering the hypothesized links between religion and democracy; the potential effects 
of belonging to faith organizations on CPSU membership; and possible links between 
religion and literacy in the tsarist period (Lankina 2012), we control for (1) the variable 
(dummy) for regions with traditionally large Muslim populations; (2) and the variable of 
share of Muslims in the regional population (based on a 2012 survey by FOM – one of 
Russia’s most prominent centers for the study of public opinion). 
- Dependence on federal funding and availability of fiscal transfers might have a bearing on 
sub-national democracy (Gervasoni 2010). We therefore also control for federal fiscal 
transfers as measured by their share in total regional expenditures. 
- Urbanization has been employed as an alternative proxy for modernization. We therefore 
control for regional urbanization levels (employing Rosstat data). 
- Since one of the components of the Russian regional democracy index is municipal 
autonomy, which could be influenced by regional size and population, we include 
measures of territory in kilometers and population as additional control variables. 
- Openness to foreign trade might co-vary with democratization, though the direction of the 
relationship is uncertain (Milner and Mukherjee 2010). We therefore employ a measure of 
the share of foreign trade in regional GDP in our additional specifications. 
- Education in 2002 might be correlated with tsarist-era education.  To ensure that 
multicollinearity is not an issue, we experimented with excluding the 2002 education 
measure from our regressions. 
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- Because of spatial continuity in modernization patterns, the 2000-2004 income variable 
might co-vary with tsarist-era education, as well as with CPSU membership saturation.  
We therefore experimented with excluding the 2000-2004 income variable. 
- Considering that the dependent variable can be interpreted as an ordered one, we re-
estimated our baseline regression using ordered logit. 
- We employ alternative proxies for CPSU membership saturation: (a) the measure of the 
share of CPSU members in the total population of a region instead of party share in the 
adult population; (b) a dummy variable for regions with above-average CPSU 
membership saturation; (c) a dummy variable for regions with CPSU membership 
saturation above the median. 
- We also employ alternative proxies for pre-communist literacy: (a) a dummy variable for 
regions with above-average levels of pre-communist literacy; (b) and a dummy variable 
for regions with pre-communist literacy above the median level. 
- Alternative proxies of democracy to those of the Carnegie index are also employed: 1) the 
expert opinion survey democracy measures reported in McMann (McMann 2006); 2) 
measures obtained by subtracting from the baseline Carnegie index the sub-components 
measuring economic liberalization and corruption, which may be beyond the scope of the 
concept of democracy; 3) measures obtained by subtracting from the baseline Carnegie 
index the sub-indicator of municipal autonomy, which is particularly relevant for 
democracy at the sub-national level; 4) the democracy measure employed by Reuter and 
Buckley (2014), in which only six sub-components of the Carnegie index are retained. 
- We employ different samples: 1) a reduced sample obtained after excluding all of the 
ethnically-defined regions with republic status, which during the Soviet period had the 
status of autonomous okrugs and therefore were part of higher-level regions (thus, we had 
no data on the size of the party organization in these regions and had to assume that the 
share of CPSU members in their population was the same as that in their parent regions); 
2) a sample obtained after excluding St. Petersburg City and Leningradskaya oblast, 
which during the Soviet period formed part of a single region (in the main regressions, we 
assumed that both regions had the same CPSU saturation levels; another rationale for 
experimenting with excluding St. Petersburg is that the region had been an outlier in terms 
of literacy during the tsarist period); 3) a sample obtained by dropping the City of 
Moscow, which had a very high number of party members and which is also an outlier in 
terms of high literacy levels during the Tsarist period. 
- Use robust regression estimator (rreg command in Stata) to reduce the impact of outliers 
on our estimations. 
- Instead of taking logs of oil and gas output in the region, we employ the ratio of the value 
of oil and gas output in the region to the regional gross domestic product. The indicator is 
computed as follows: we multiply the total extraction of oil by the average export price of 
oil in USD and the total extraction of gas by the average export price of gas in USD. This 
value (in millions of USD) is divided by regional gross domestic product (in thousands of 
USD). The data on oil and gas extraction and GDP are from Rosstat; the data on export 
prices are from the Central Bank of Russia. Export prices for oil are reported in barrel and 
oil extraction in tons; to recompute tons into barrels we employ BP conversion tables.  
 
Stage 2 
 
- Instead of the two baseline proxies of well-being employed in the paper—monthly salary 
in 1975 and infant mortality—we employ alternative proxies: housing construction per 
capita in 1976; number of medical doctors per capita in 1976; and total retail trade in 
1976. All of these measures capture regional quality of life (access to social services may 
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be even more important than monetary income in the Soviet Union, where most benefits 
were allocated through direct redistribution and not through trade). We also employ the 
measure of average income per capita in 1985. 
- We experimented with adding variables that would allow us to control for the effects of 
pre-communist social structure in the gubernii. In particular, we employ the measures of 
regional population share of those listed in the 1897 Fist Imperial Census as peasants; 
those listed as petty bourgeoisie/ town dwellers (meshchane); and those in the category of 
“outsiders,” that is, migrants residing outside of the region in which they had been born. 
Historians have suggested that these imperial census categories are an imperfect 
representation of imperial Russia’s rapidly changing and fluid society at the turn of the 
century (Balzer 1996; Fitzpatrick 1993; Haimson 1988). Nevertheless, absent more 
accurate data, we include these admittedly imperfect measures because, as we discuss in 
the qualitative analysis part of the paper, pre-Revolutionary social origins may have 
influenced the likelihood and patterns of Communist Party recruitment in the period 
immediately after the Bolshevik Revolution. This effect could have persisted over the 
communist decades. 
- Pre-communist literacy levels were higher in areas with high population density. At the 
same time, CPSU membership could be also affected by the density variable due to the 
imperatives of having separate party organizations in municipalities. We therefore control 
for population density (number of people per square kilometer of regional territory) as of 
January 1, 1978 (Moscow and Leningrad were excluded due to lack of data). 
- Since the dependent variable of this regression is bound from above and from below 
(100% and 0%, respectively), which could create problems when estimating OLS, we use 
a log-odds transformation of the dependent variable. 
- We experimented with employing different transformations of the CPSU saturation 
variable and literacy variable (as in tests for Stage 1); if the dependent variable becomes 
binary, we use both logit and OLS to estimate our regressions. 
- We also employ different samples: (a) Drop the City of Moscow with very high CPSU 
membership saturation; drop tsarist literacy given that Moscow had been an outlier in 
terms of high literacy levels during the tsarist period; (b) Drop St. Petersburg and 
Leningradskaya oblast, which during the Soviet period formed part of a single region (in 
the full sample, we assumed that both regions had the same levels of CPSU member 
saturation); furthermore, St. Petersburg is an outlier in terms of imperial-era literacy. 
- Hypothetically, we may observe a curvilinear effect of pre-communist literacy on CPSU 
membership (for a discussion of the presence of such a curvilinear effect under Brazil’s 
authoritarian regime, see (Geddes and Zaller 1989). For instance, it is possible that both 
those highly educated (because they may be politically more discerning or otherwise 
disagree with the communist doctrine on ideological grounds), and those least educated 
(because illiteracy may have limited exposure to communist print media featuring 
propaganda), members of the past order might have been less amenable to cooptation by 
the new regime. We estimate specification (1) adding the squared share of literates term. 
- Soviet rules for admission into the party varied for those employed in different branches 
of the economy and, among those engaged in manual occupations, were particularly 
favorable for industrial workers. Precise regional data on employment by industry during 
the Soviet period is not available. We replicate our regressions controlling for extraction 
of coal and steel production in 1975, thereby capturing the effect of traditional “heavy 
industries.” 
- We use the robust regression estimator, as in the Stage 1. 
- We employ an alternative approach to compute the variable proxying for the legacy of 
repression against ethnic groups in particular regions. To begin with, our objective is to 
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ascertain the share of regional populations (in the 1970s) belonging to ethnic groups that 
had suffered deportations and possibly career constraints. If the region had a high share of 
these groups prior to deportation, but these groups did not return to their native regions 
after Stalin’s death and partial rehabilitation, the fact of repressions should not affect party 
membership. The original dummy variable that we employed was constructed according 
to these criteria; but it took only those regions into account, to which the repressed groups 
returned and which received the status of an ethnic autonomy. In some cases, the return of 
repressed groups was not followed by the granting of autonomy status; the repressed 
groups may have also failed to return to their native lands. As part of our robustness 
checks, we devise a proxy to deal with this problem. Specifically, we employ the 1979 
census data to compute for each region the share of populations belonging to repressed 
groups, namely the Koreans, Germans, Finns, Greeks, Kalmyks, Karachaevs, Chechens, 
Ingush, Balkars, Crimean Tatars, and Meskhetian Turks. This measure is then employed 
in lieu of the dummy variable for regions that had suffered repressions against particular 
ethnic groups. A similar measure is also devised for Jewish populations, considering the 
known semi-official practice of anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union. Note that the results 
employing these measures should be interpreted with caution considering that members of 
the repressed and discriminated groups may have sought to conceal their ethnic origins.  
- We also introduce a dummy variable for regions in which the repressed groups had been 
residing originally rather than regions to which they were resettled. In this case our 
objective is different: we seek to find out whether the interruption of population 
continuity between pre-communist and communist periods had an impact on regional 
party saturation. In some regions the repressed groups, which failed to return to their 
native lands, represented a large fraction of pre-communist literates. One example of such 
a group, as discussed in the paper, is the Volga Germans; generally, many ethnic Germans 
failed to return to the Volga regions after deportations to Central Asia. In the Saratov and 
Volgograd oblasti, which cover the former territories of the Volga German Republic, in 
2002 ethnic Germans comprised only 0.45% and 0.63% of the population, respectively. 
(These low numbers are likely to be a reflection of recent emigration to Germany, among 
other factors). We create a dummy variable that takes the value of one for regions in 
which historically the following groups resided: Ingermanland Finns, Volga Germans, 
Koreans, Pontian Greeks, Kalmyks, Karachaevs, Chechens, Ingush and Balkars (the other 
repressed groups resided originally outside of the RSFSR territories included in our 
analysis), and zero otherwise. We obtain a list of fourteen regions: Ingushetia, Kabardino-
Balkaria, Kalmykia, Karelia, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, Khabarovsk krai, Primorsky krai, 
Leningradskaya oblast, St. Petersburg, Krasnodar krai, Saratov oblast, Volgograd oblast, 
Stavropol krai and Pskov oblast. We then employ this dummy variable instead of the 
original measure capturing regions which had been populated by repressed peoples and 
which were later allowed to return. 
 
Stage 3 
 
- We replicate most of the robustness checks described above.  
- We also run a specification with binary treatment: our measure of literacy share is 
replaced with a dummy variable with the value of 1 if literacy is above the mean in the 
sample and 0 otherwise. 
- We re-estimate all regressions employing the Imai et al. code in R, to demonstrate that the 
use of statistical software (R or Stata) has no impact on our results. 
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Results 
 
S5.1: This Table presents results of additional robustness checks for Stage 1 (only beta 
coefficients and standard errors of key covariates are reported) 
Check Effect of 
literacy 
Effect of 
CPSU 
membership 
Control for distance to Helsinki 0.253*** 
(0.065) 
-2.631*** 
(0.685) 
Control for distance to Helsinki, drop distance to Moscow 0.294*** 
(0.068) 
-2.488*** 
(0.688) 
Use alternative proxy of distance to Moscow 0.308*** 
(0.070) 
-2.472*** 
(0.696) 
Control for distance to Helsinki, use alternative proxy of distance to 
Moscow 
0.221*** 
(0.075) 
-2.333*** 
(0.706) 
Control for the national regime’s perception of significance of a 
particular region  
0.314*** 
(0.076) 
-2.455*** 
(0.731) 
Control for the national regime’s perception of significance of a 
particular region, drop Krasnodar (Sochi) and St. Petersburg 
0.221*** 
(0.075) 
-2.334*** 
(0.706) 
Control for the impact of economic statism 0.253*** 
(0.071) 
-1.995*** 
(0.624) 
Control for Muslim populations (dummy) 0.311*** 
(0.067) 
-2.347*** 
(0.694) 
Control for Muslim populations (share of Muslims) 0.324*** 
(0.072) 
-2.479*** 
(0.686) 
Control for federal fiscal transfers 0.278*** 
(0.071) 
-2.155*** 
(0.638) 
Control for regional size and population 0.331*** 
(0.070) 
-2.114*** 
(0.695) 
Control for trade openness 0.322*** 
(0.085) 
-2.507*** 
(0.737) 
Control for urbanization 0.247*** 
(0.072) 
-2.253*** 
(0.614) 
Exclude the 2002 education control variable  0.324*** 
(0.062) 
-2.388*** 
(0.681) 
Exclude the 2000-2004 income control variable 0.315*** 
(0.076) 
-2.155*** 
(0.644) 
Ordered logit 0.100*** 
(0.030) 
-0.660** 
(0.319) 
Employ a different proxy of party saturation (binary variable based on 
mean CPSU membership) 
0.225*** 
(0.067) 
-4.205*** 
(1.695) 
Employ a different proxy of saturation (binary variable based on 
median CPSU membership) 
0.224*** 
(0.064) 
-4.242*** 
(1.551) 
Employ a different proxy for literacy (binary variable based on mean 
literacy) 
5.383*** 
(1.315) 
-2.485*** 
(0.706) 
Employ a different measure of literacy (binary variable based on 
median literacy) 
6.354*** 
(1.224) 
-2.533*** 
(0.617) 
Employ an alternative measure of democracy (McMann index) 1.824*** 
(0.432) 
-11.318*** 
(4.069) 
17 
 
Employ an alternative measure of democracy (exclude economic 
liberalization and corruption from the index) 
0.239*** 
(0.059) 
-1.998*** 
(0.629) 
Employ an alternative measure of democracy (exclude municipal 
autonomy from the index) 
0.289*** 
(0.063) 
-2.243*** 
(0.624) 
Employ an alternative measure of democracy (from the index, as in 
Reuter and Buckley 2014) 
0.189*** 
(0.045) 
-1.520*** 
(0.498) 
Employ a different sample (exclude regions that formed part of larger 
administrative regions in the Soviet period) 
0.336*** 
(0.069) 
-2.478*** 
(0.659) 
Employ a different sample (exclude St. Petersburg and 
Leningradskaya oblast) 
0.302*** 
(0.087) 
-2.427*** 
(0.692) 
Employ a different sample (exclude the City of Moscow) 0.288*** 
(0.070) 
-2.191*** 
(0.698) 
Control for oil and gas extraction per unit of regional GDP 0.311*** 
(0.069) 
-2.593*** 
(0.671) 
Robust regressions 0.311*** 
(0.094) 
-2.287*** 
(0.643) 
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S5.2: Summary of additional robustness checks, Stage 2 (only beta coefficients and 
standard errors of key covariates are reported) 
Check Effect of 
literacy 
Control for well-being employing alternative measures (housing construction) 0.091*** 
(0.019) 
Control for well-being employing alternative measures (doctors per capita) 0.088*** 
(0.019) 
Control for well-being employing alternative measures (retail trade) 0.088*** 
(0.018) 
Control for well-being employing alternative measures (1985 income per capita) 0.090*** 
(0.019) 
Control for Tsarist social structure 0.048* 
(0.026) 
Control for population density 0.102*** 
(0.023) 
Log-odds transformation 0.011*** 
(0.002) 
Employ a different proxy of party saturation (binary variable based on mean CPSU 
membership), OLS 
0.027*** 
(0.007) 
Employ a different proxy of party saturation (binary variable based on mean CPSU 
membership), logit 
0.465*** 
(0.109) 
Employ a different proxy of party saturation (binary variable based on median CPSU 
membership), OLS 
0.025*** 
(0.006) 
Employ a different proxy of party saturation (binary variable based on median CPSU 
membership), logit 
0.483*** 
(0.120) 
Employ a different proxy of literacy (binary variable based on mean literacy) 1.587*** 
(0.333) 
Employ a different proxy of literacy (binary variable based on median literacy) 1.348*** 
(0.400) 
Employ a different sample (exclude St. Petersburg and Leningradskaya oblast) 0.085*** 
(0.028) 
Employ different sample (exclude the City of Moscow) 0.084*** 
(0.014) 
Curvilinear effect (reported the effect of linear and of squared terms sequentially). Note: 
maximum of the parabola is achieved at the level of literacy equal to 98.5%, which is 
above the literacy level of any region in our sample. Hence, for the actually observed 
values of literacy, the effect of literacy on CPSU membership is positive and significant 
0.197*** 
(0.064) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
Control for Soviet industrial structure 0.088*** 
(0.020) 
Control for the legacy of repression against ethnic groups by employing the measure of 
population share of these groups instead of employing a regional dummy 
0.085*** 
(0.019) 
Control for the legacy of repression against ethnic groups by employing the measure of 
population share of these groups, as well as share of Jewish population 
0.085*** 
(0.019) 
Control for the legacy of repression against ethnic groups by employing a dummy for 
regions from which particular ethnic groups had been deported irrespective of whether 
these groups returned to their regions of origin or not 
0.090*** 
(0.017) 
Robust regressions 0.084*** 
(0.018) 
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S5.3: Summary of additional robustness checks on Stage 3 
Specification Effect Mean 95% confidence 
interval 
Drop education 2002 from the set of control variables ACME -0.222 -0.414 -0.068 
 
Direct 
effect 0.336 0.221 0.450 
 Total effect 0.113 0.000 0.201 
Drop income 2000-2004 from the set of control variables ACME -0.196 -0.369 -0.055 
 
Direct 
effect 0.342 0.198 0.486 
 Total effect 0.147 0.054 0.239 
Employ monthly salary (1975) as a proxy for Soviet-period 
income ACME -0.202 -0.352 -0.083 
 
Direct 
effect 0.336 0.200 0.468 
 Total effect 0.134 -0.017 0.285 
Employ income per capita (1985) as a proxy for Soviet-
period income ACME -0.224 -0.385 -0.095 
 
Direct 
effect 0.336 0.200 0.468 
 Total effect 0.112 -0.049 0.265 
Employ housing construction per capita as a proxy for 
Soviet-period income ACME -0.228 -0.394 -0.096 
 
Direct 
effect 0.336 0.200 0.468 
 Total effect 0.108 -0.055 0.263 
Employ doctors per capita as a proxy for Soviet-period 
income ACME -0.221 -0.380 -0.093 
 
Direct 
effect 0.336 0.200 0.468 
 Total effect 0.115 -0.046 0.268 
Employ retail trade as a proxy for Soviet-period income  ACME -0.221 -0.378 -0.094 
 
Direct 
effect 0.336 0.200 0.468 
 Total effect 0.115 -0.045 0.266 
Control for Soviet-period ethnic structure ACME -0.190 -0.368 -0.060 
 
Direct 
effect 0.336 0.200 0.468 
 Total effect 0.146 0.054 0.226 
Control for Tsarist social structure ACME -0.117 -0.278 0.004 
 
Direct 
effect 0.336 0.200 0.468 
 Total effect 0.220 0.048 0.398 
Control for Soviet population density ACME -0.230 -0.452 -0.066 
 
Direct 
effect 0.324 0.173 0.470 
 Total effect 0.094 -0.030 0.199 
Control for Soviet industrial structure ACME -0.215 -0.380 -0.093 
 
Direct 
effect 0.336 0.200 0.468 
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 Total effect 0.121 -0.044 0.272 
Employ democracy index 1991-2001 ACME -0.233 -0.401 -0.107 
 
Direct 
effect 0.395 0.234 0.552 
 Total effect 0.162 -0.018 0.329 
Control for oil and gas extraction per unit of regional GDP in 
2000-2004 ACME -0.221 -0.379 -0.097 
 
Direct 
effect 0.337 0.204 0.467 
 Total effect 0.116 -0.042 0.272 
Control for the legacy of repression against particular ethnic 
groups by employing the measure of population share of 
these groups instead of employing a regional dummy ACME -0.212 -0.368 -0.088 
 
Direct 
effect 0.336 0.200 0.468 
 Total effect 0.124 -0.033 0.277 
Control for the legacy of repression against particular ethnic 
groups by employing the measure of population share of 
these groups, as well as share of Jewish population  ACME -0.212 -0.368 -0.088 
 
Direct 
effect 0.336 0.200 0.468 
 Total effect 0.124 -0.033 0.276 
Control for urbanization in 2000-2004 ACME -0.201 -0.353 -0.092 
 
Direct 
effect 0.258 0.119 0.409 
 Total effect 0.057 -0.119 0.221 
Binary treatment ACME -3.982 -6.919 -1.603 
 
Direct 
effect 5.539 2.951 8.054 
 Total effect 1.557 -1.596 4.493 
Control for the legacy of repression against particular ethnic 
groups by employing a dummy for regions from which 
particular ethnic groups had been deported irrespective of 
whether these groups returned to their regions of origin or not ACME -0.226 -0.381 -0.100 
 
Direct 
effect 0.336 0.200 0.468 
 Total effect 0.111 -0.047 0.259 
Note: see Table 3 
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S5.4: Mediation analysis employing the Imai et al. code in R (for baseline regressions 
and robustness checks)  
Specification Effect Mean 
95% confidence 
interval 
p-
value 
Baseline specification ACME -0.207 -0.346 -0.091 0.00 
 
Direct 
effect 0.338 0.171 0.500 0.00 
 Total effect 0.131 -0.038 0.301 0.12 
Robustness checks      
Drop education 2002 from the set of control variables ACME -0.211 -0.343 -0.099 0.00 
 
Direct 
effect 0.334 0.180 0.485 0.00 
 Total effect 0.123 -0.043 0.279 0.14 
Drop income 2000-2004 from the set of control 
variables ACME -0.187 -0.320 -0.074 0.00 
 
Direct 
effect 0.340 0.167 0.514 0.00 
 Total effect 0.153 -0.016 0.319 0.08 
Employ monthly salary (1975) as a proxy for Soviet-
period income ACME -0.201 -0.341 -0.093 0.00 
 
Direct 
effect 0.337 0.161 0.503 0.00 
 Total effect 0.137 -0.028 0.305 0.12 
Employ income per capita (1985) as a proxy for 
Soviet-period income ACME -0.223 -0.363 -0.109 0.00 
 
Direct 
effect 0.339 0.173 0.512 0.00 
 Total effect 0.116 -0.060 0.286 0.20 
Employ housing construction per capita as a proxy for 
Soviet-period income ACME -0.229 -0.391 -0.103 0.00 
 
Direct 
effect 0.333 0.159 0.503 0.00 
 Total effect 0.104 -0.071 0.275 0.24 
Employ doctors per capita as a proxy for Soviet-
period income ACME -0.216 -0.356 -0.094 0.00 
 
Direct 
effect 0.335 0.170 0.505 0.00 
 Total effect 0.119 -0.056 0.289 0.19 
Employ retail trade as a proxy for Soviet-period 
income  ACME -0.218 -0.364 -0.101 0.00 
 
Direct 
effect 0.334 0.154 0.508 0.00 
 Total effect 0.116 -0.079 0.287 0.20 
Control for Soviet-period ethnic structure ACME -0.183 -0.308 -0.080 0.00 
 
Direct 
effect 0.333 0.157 0.502 0.00 
 Total effect 0.150 -0.013 0.314 0.09 
Control for tsarist social structure ACME -0.119 -0.256 -0.004 0.00 
 
Direct 
effect 0.339 0.172 0.514 0.05 
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 Total effect 0.220 0.031 0.425 0.02 
Control for Soviet population density ACME -0.221 -0.387 -0.088 0.00 
 
Direct 
effect 0.322 0.133 0.508 0.00 
 Total effect 0.101 -0.083 0.280 0.27 
Control for Soviet industrial structure ACME -0.222 -0.365 -0.102 0.00 
 
Direct 
effect 0.343 0.165 0.515 0.00 
 Total effect 0.122 -0.058 0.292 0.20 
Employ democracy index 1991-2001 ACME -0.224 -0.375 -0.105 0.00 
 
Direct 
effect 0.399 0.226 0.565 0.00 
 Total effect 0.175 0.012 0.345 0.04 
Control for oil and gas extraction per unit of regional 
GDP in 2000-2004 ACME -0.221 -0.359 -0.105 0.00 
 
Direct 
effect 0.393 0.227 0.562 0.00 
 Total effect 0.173 0.006 0.344 0.04 
Control for the legacy of repression against particular 
ethnic groups by employing the measure of 
population share of these groups instead of employing 
a regional dummy ACME -0.212 -0.348 -0.094 0.00 
 
Direct 
effect 0.334 0.158 0.500 0.00 
 Total effect 0.123 -0.058 0.286 0.17 
Control for the legacy of repression against particular 
ethnic groups by employing the measure of 
population share of these groups, as well as share of 
Jewish population ACME -0.208 -0.340 -0.091 0.00 
 
Direct 
effect 0.335 0.166 0.505 0.00 
 Total effect 0.127 -0.042 0.301 0.16 
Control for urbanization 2000-2004 ACME -0.197 -0.355 -0.075 0.00 
 
Direct 
effect 0.259 0.041 0.409 0.02 
 Total effect 0.062 -0.191 0.218 0.55 
Binary treatment ACME -3.980 -6.870 -1.750 0.00 
 
Direct 
effect 5.550 2.770 8.220 0.00 
 Total effect 1.580 -1.470 4.700 0.29 
Control for the legacy of repression against particular 
ethnic groups by employing a dummy for regions 
from which the ethnic groups had been deported 
irrespective of whether these groups returned to their 
regions of origin or not ACME -0.226 -0.379 -0.101 0.00 
 
Direct 
effect 0.337 0.161 0.517 0.00 
 Total effect 0.111 -0.066 0.283 0.22 
Note: see Table 3 
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Appendix S6: Impact of outliers on the results of the estimation 
 
The distribution of both literacy and party saturation is characterized by a number of outliers 
(see Appendix S3). We address this issue in the following ways. Already in the robustness 
checks for stages 1 and 2 of our analysis we re-ran our regressions employing the so-called 
robust regression estimator in Stata, which is meant to be less sensitive to outliers (Appendix 
S5). In what follows we also perform a number of further tests: 
 Remove the first and the last 5-percentiles of the distribution of the literacy and of the 
party saturation indicators from the sample;  
 Remove 5 percent observations with the highest value of literacy and of party saturation 
(we pay particular attention to high values because this is where most outliers appear to be 
concentrated);  
 Remove observations with very high literacy and party saturation values based on a visual 
inspection of the distribution of the key variables.  
None of these tests change our results in a substantial way. 
 
S6.1: Changes in the results of Stage 1 after removing outliers 
Check Effect of 
literacy 
Effect of 
party 
saturation 
Exclude 5% and 95% percentiles of party saturation 0.236** 
(0.110) 
-2.146** 
(0.824) 
Exclude 5% and 95% percentiles of literacy 0.485** 
(0.192) 
-2.554*** 
(0.805) 
Exclude 95% percentile of party saturation 0.311*** 
(0.109) 
-2.463*** 
(0.742) 
Exclude 95% percentile of literacy 0.331** 
(0.131) 
-2.294*** 
(0.747) 
Exclude regions with party saturation exceeding 9%  0.468*** 
(0.149) 
-3.621*** 
(0.926) 
Exclude regions with literacy exceeding 35% 0.401*** 
(0.144) 
-2.441*** 
(0.756) 
 
S6.2: Changes in the results of Stage 2 after removing outliers 
Check Effect of 
literacy 
Exclude 5% and 95% percentiles of party saturation 0.114*** 
(0.021) 
Exclude 5% and 95% percentiles of literacy 0.123*** 
(0.040) 
Exclude 95% percentile of party saturation 0.112*** 
(0.022) 
Exclude 95% percentile of literacy 0.105*** 
(0.026) 
Exclude regions with party saturation exceeding 9%  0.053** 
(0.023) 
Exclude regions with literacy exceeding 35% 0.121*** 
(0.027) 
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S6.3: Changes in the results of Stage 3 after removing outliers 
Specification Effect Mean 95% confidence 
interval 
Exclude 5% and 95% percentiles of party saturation ACME -0.230 -0.444 -0.060 
 
Direct 
effect 0.258 0.039 0.471 
 Total effect 0.028 -0.197 0.241 
Exclude 5% and 95% percentiles of literacy ACME -0.332 -0.650 -0.097 
 
Direct 
effect 0.444 0.082 0.796 
 Total effect 0.112 -0.234 0.490 
Exclude 95% percentile of party saturation ACME -0.256 -0.458 -0.097 
 
Direct 
effect 0.336 0.123 0.543 
 Total effect 0.080 -0.143 0.305 
Exclude 95% percentile of  literacy ACME -0.266 -0.504 -0.089 
 
Direct 
effect 0.363 0.102 0.616 
 Total effect 0.097 -0.153 0.364 
Exclude regions with party saturation exceeding 9% ACME -0.252 -0.516 -0.035 
 
Direct 
effect 0.510 0.214 0.797 
 Total effect 0.258 -0.088 0.637 
Exclude regions with literacy exceeding 35% ACME -0.323 -0.595 -0.121 
 
Direct 
effect 0.451 0.184 0.710 
 Total effect 0.128 -0.135 0.409 
Note: see Table 3 
 
S6.4: Sensitivity analysis 
Specification 
rho, at which  ACME = 
0 
Exclude 5% and 95% percentiles of party saturation -0.223 
Exclude 5% and 95% percentiles of literacy -0.248 
Exclude 95% percentile of party saturation -0.289 
Exclude 95% percentile of literacy -0.289 
Exclude regions with party saturation exceeding 9%  -0.425 
Exclude regions with literacy exceeding 35% -0.304 
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Appendix S7: Effects for individual sub-components of the democracy index 
 
We here replicate our estimations in which we employed the composite democracy index, for 
individual sub-components of this index. Table S7.1 replicates the Table 1 of the main part of 
the paper for each of these sub-components. The general results do not change, regardless of 
which of the dimensions we employ. The regressions suggest that party saturation has a 
negative effect on all of the dimensions of the index, with the exception of electoral freedoms. 
At the same time, we find that regions with comparatively higher levels of pre-communist 
literacy have higher democracy scores irrespective of which sub-indicator of the index is 
employed, with the exception of the municipal autonomy and composition of elites sub-
components of the democracy index.  
 
Table S7.2 estimates the mediation analysis model for each of the sub-components. The 
results are not substantively different. With the exception of the elections sub-component, the 
indirect effect is always significantly different from zero and negative; with the exception of 
the municipal autonomy and composition of regional elites sub-components of the democracy 
index, the direct effect is significantly different from zero and positive. The total effect is 
insignificant at the 5 percent level, except for elections, where it is significant and positive. 
This is hardly surprising: for this variable the CPSU legacy appears to have no effect; this is 
important in terms of identifying the mechanisms of the persistence of the party saturation 
legacy. Overall, again, the positive direct effect of literacy on democracy is offset by the 
negative indirect effect of party saturation. The magnitude of the direct and indirect effects is 
of course smaller than for the aggregate index, since the index itself varies on a smaller scale 
(from 1 to 5). Specifically, we find a direct effect in the magnitude of 0.02 – 0.04 and an 
indirect effect of minus 0.01 – 0.03, depending on the specification. 
 
S7.1: The effect of communist and pre-communist legacies on various aspects of 
democracy, 2000-2004, OLS 
Dimension  Share of CPSU members Literacy 
 beta s.e. beta s.e. 
Openness -0.264** (0.100) 0.038*** (0.010) 
Elections -0.137 (0.100) 0.028*** (0.011) 
Pluralism -0.254*** (0.088) 0.025*** (0.009) 
Media -0.359*** (0.102) 0.038*** (0.009) 
Economic liberalization -0.229*** (0.079) 0.039*** (0.010) 
Civil society -0.282*** (0.105) 0.036*** (0.011) 
Political organization -0.294*** (0.081) 0.031** (0.012) 
Elites -0.224*** (0.081) 0.023 (0.014) 
Corruption -0.200** (0.084) 0.030** (0.012) 
Municipal autonomy -0.185** (0.088) 0.019 (0.012) 
 
Note: See Table 1. All other covariates of specification (1), Table 1, included in the 
regressions. 
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S7.2: Mediation analysis for various dimensions of democracy 
 
Dimension Effect Mean 95% confidence interval 
Openness ACME -0.023 -0.043 -0.007 
 Direct effect 0.042 0.023 0.061 
 Total effect 0.019 -0.002 0.039 
Elections ACME -0.011 -0.030 0.003 
 Direct effect 0.035 0.016 0.054 
 Total effect 0.024 0.004 0.043 
Pluralism ACME -0.024 -0.042 -0.010 
 Direct effect 0.027 0.011 0.043 
 Total effect 0.003 -0.016 0.023 
Media ACME -0.031 -0.054 -0.014 
 Direct effect 0.039 0.021 0.056 
 Total effect 0.008 -0.015 0.029 
Economic liberalization ACME -0.024 -0.042 -0.009 
 Direct effect 0.042 0.024 0.058 
 Total effect 0.018 0.000 0.036 
Civil society ACME -0.028 -0.051 -0.010 
 Direct effect 0.038 0.016 0.059 
 Total effect 0.010 -0.013 0.032 
Political organization ACME -0.026 -0.045 -0.012 
 Direct effect 0.031 0.008 0.054 
 Total effect 0.005 -0.015 0.028 
Elites ACME -0.021 -0.041 -0.007 
 Direct effect 0.027 -0.002 0.055 
 Total effect 0.006 -0.025 0.038 
Corruption ACME -0.018 -0.034 -0.005 
 Direct effect 0.031 0.008 0.052 
 Total effect 0.013 -0.004 0.032 
Municipal autonomy ACME -0.016 -0.033 -0.002 
 Direct effect 0.022 -0.001 0.045 
 Total effect 0.006 -0.013 0.027 
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S7.3: Robustness checks: Estimation of S8.2 employing the R code devised by Imai et al. 
 
Dimension Effect Mean 
95% confidence 
interval 
p-
value 
Openness ACME -0.023 -0.041 -0.008 0.00 
 
Direct 
effect 0.042 0.018 0.065 0.00 
 Total effect 0.019 -0.004 0.042 0.10 
Elections ACME -0.011 -0.028 0.003 0.12 
 
Direct 
effect 0.033 0.009 0.061 0.01 
 Total effect 0.022 -0.001 0.047 0.07 
Pluralism ACME -0.021 -0.038 -0.007 0.00 
 
Direct 
effect 0.029 0.005 0.052 0.01 
 Total effect 0.008 -0.015 0.031 0.50 
Media ACME -0.031 -0.050 -0.014 0.00 
 
Direct 
effect 0.041 0.017 0.064 0.00 
 Total effect 0.010 -0.016 0.034 0.39 
Economic liberalization ACME -0.018 -0.036 -0.005 0.00 
 
Direct 
effect 0.042 0.019 0.067 0.00 
 Total effect 0.024 0.001 0.046 0.04 
Civil society ACME -0.024 -0.042 -0.009 0.00 
 
Direct 
effect 0.038 0.014 0.061 0.00 
 Total effect 0.014 -0.010 0.036 0.24 
Political organization ACME -0.027 -0.045 -0.013 0.00 
 
Direct 
effect 0.032 0.014 0.051 0.00 
 Total effect 0.005 -0.014 0.026 0.60 
Elites ACME -0.200 -0.039 -0.005 0.01 
 
Direct 
effect 0.027 0.000 0.052 0.05 
 Total effect 0.007 -0.018 0.031 0.56 
Corruption ACME -0.018 -0.034 -0.005 0.01 
 
Direct 
effect 0.030 0.009 0.053 0.01 
 Total effect 0.012 -0.011 0.033 0.27 
Municipal autonomy ACME -0.016 -0.035 -0.003 0.02 
 
Direct 
effect 0.021 -0.003 0.047 0.10 
 Total effect 0.005 -0.018 0.028 0.69 
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S7.4: Sensitivity analysis 
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Dimension of democracy: Municipal autonomy 
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Dimension of democracy: Pluralism 
-.
2
-.
1
0
.1
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 m
e
d
ia
ti
o
n
 e
ff
e
c
t
-1 -.5 0 .5 1
Sensitivity parameter: p
ACME(p)
 
Dimension of democracy: Media 
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Dimension of democracy: Corruption 
 
Dimension 
rho, at which  ACME = 
0 
Openness -0.290 
Elections -0.187 
Pluralism -0.272 
Media -0.386 
Economic liberalization -0.302 
Civil society -0.346 
Political organization -0.515 
Elites -0.261 
Corruption -0.370 
Municipal autonomy -0.151 
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Appendix S8: Visual representation of the co-variance between party saturation and 
pre-communist literacy 
 
The following two graphs visually illustrate the presence of a strong link between CPSU 
membership levels and pre-communist literacy. The first graph represents a scatterplot of all 
regions for these two variables. Vertical and horizontal lines separate the image into four 
areas based on the means of CPSU membership and pre-communist literacy, respectively. The 
correlation between the two variables is very strong and only a few regions belong to the 
categories of “high CPSU membership – low literacy” and “high literacy – low CPSU 
membership.” Considering that the figure is influenced by a few outliers (which, as our 
analysis in S6 shows, do not change our results), we also create another figure, excluding the 
outliers. It is evident that most of the observations are located close to the regression line. Pre-
communist literacy thus remains a good predictor of regional party saturation levels. 
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Appendix S9: Factors altering the effect of literacy on levels of party saturation 
In what follows, we investigate which factors account for the “under-performance” or “over-
performance” of regions with respect to party saturation considering their imperial-era literacy 
levels. We employ two procedures for these purposes. We begin by devising two dummy 
variables. The first takes the value of one for Type 3 outlier regions. The second is equal to 
one for Type 4 outliers. We then regress these variables on a set of potentially relevant 
covariates. Specifically, we regress the outlier variables on the following communist-era 
variables: (a) population density and population size; (b) production of coal and steel; (c) 
dummy for regions located on the borders of the USSR; (d) share of ethnic Russians; and (e) 
infant mortality as a proxy for quality of life. The regressions are estimated using logit 
because the dependent variable is binary.  
 
We find that the likelihood of becoming a Type 3 region is significantly higher if the level of 
steel production in a region is high. An illustrative example of a region with historically well-
developed mining industry is Chelyabinsk, which had been the industrial powerhouse of the 
Urals well before the Bolshevik Revolution.  In fact, most of the region’s towns originated as 
early as the 17
th
 century and were linked to the development of iron and steel mining in the 
Urals Mountains (McFaul and Petrov 1998). Generally, throughout the USSR, Rigby (1968) 
found that regions specialising on mining and metallurgy tended to have relatively low party 
saturation levels despite being highly urbanized. These patterns help nuance our 
understanding of the links between indicators that conventionally capture modernization 
processes, and party recruitment.
1
 For instance, Ukraine’s Kharkov and Dnepropetrovsk 
regions had been more party saturated than the heavily mining Donbass (Donetsk and 
Lugansk oblasts) even though the former had far larger rural populations than the latter. 
Employment as a mining worker is associated with hardship and occupational hazards. Party 
membership among miners would not have been regarded as a means for career progression 
in the same way that would have been the case for occupations requiring more advanced skills 
and having greater social prestige. At the same time, quality of life factors whereby centres of 
mining were perceived as less-desirable places to live, would account for lower numbers of 
cadre who would want to be parachuted into these regions from outside (Rigby 1968).
2
 
                                                          
1
 Thus, in Soviet Ukraine, regions that historically developed as centres of commerce, culture, or leisure like 
Crimea and Odessa also had disproportionately high concentrations of party members. In fact Crimea was found 
to be Ukraine’s most party saturated province (Rigby 1968). 
2
 Another potentially significant factor accounting for low levels of party saturation is the presence of high-tech 
industries, as well as of closed cities (which often went together). The Chelyabinsk region had several such 
“numbered” cities with no names: Chelyabinsk-65, Chelyabinsk-70, etc. For understandable reasons, data on the 
precise share of scientists employed in these closed cities are not available, so we cannot conclusively ascertain 
the significance of this variable for all regions. However, we find interesting parallels between Chelyabinsk and 
another Type 3 (high literacy, low party saturation) region, namely Nizhniy Novgorod (Nizhegorodskaya 
oblast). Like Chelyabinsk, the Type 3 Nizhegorodskaya oblast had been a hub of industrial development and 
trade already in the 19
th
 century. During the Soviet period, the Nizhny Novgorod city emerged as the USSR’s 
leading centre of science and high the development of technologies.  At the same time, the city of Sarov, which 
became the closed city of Arzamas-16, turned into the USSR’s “capital of nuclear research” (McFaul and Petrov 
1998, Vol. 2, 696). By the mid-1990s, science and science-related spheres, along with culture and the arts, 
constituted the second largest sources of regional employment after industry. Party membership statistics by 
research discipline indicate that hard sciences and engineering had been among the least party saturated areas of 
research. For instance, while in 1947, 17 percent of engineering professors were CPSU members, 58 professors 
in the social sciences and philosophy possessed CPSU membership cards (Rigby 1968, 445). Derluguian (2005, 
110) notes that “hard” sciences represented “the main breeding ground for liberal dissidents, . . . especially the 
advanced fields of nuclear research and space exploration. During the 1950s and 1970s, these scholarly 
communities [along with other professions like linguists] enjoyed privileged funding, exceptionally high public 
acclaim, and relatively unrestricted intellectual exchanges with their Western colleagues.”  The pursuit of such 
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We also find that the likelihood of becoming a Type 4 region is significantly higher for 
regions with high population density. Furthermore, regions with a high share of ethnic 
Russians in their population also had a significantly higher likelihood of being a Type 4 
region (conversely, regions with non-Russian minority groups were less likely to have high 
levels of party saturation). The results with regard to population density partially corroborate 
the patterns that Rigby (1968) uncovered in analyzing regional variations in party recruitment 
in the USSR. For instance, he found that in rural areas, party organizations tended to be linked 
to village soviets—that is, to territorial administrative centers—rather than to production units 
like the Kolkhozy (collective farms). Accordingly, we may infer from these patterns that 
sparsely populated regions with correspondingly low densities of administrative centres 
would feature comparatively low levels of party saturation (Rigby 1968, 292). The reverse 
would be true for densely populated regions with many towns that would each have a party 
administrative body attached to it. The result for regions with minority ethnic groups likewise 
corroborate the patterns suggested in Rigby’s (1968) USSR-wide analysis of party 
recruitment, namely that party recruitment levels often tended to be lower in the “ethnic” 
republics and autonomies due to issues of self-selection or discrimination against particular 
groups (though some “ethnic” groups—notably Georgians and Armenians—did feature high 
party membership levels (Rigby 1968, 378)). These general patterns would also explain why 
the few “ethnic” regions that featured comparatively high literacy in the imperial period—
Karelia and Komi—ended up among the Type 3 regions (high literacy-low saturation).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
“obscure interests… beyond the focus of official Marxist-Leninist ideology… helped to foster cohesive 
communities with a sense of professional dignity and kinship with the intellectual community outside the USSR.  
It is no small matter that such disciplines normally required a familiarity with esoteric concepts and at least a 
basic knowledge of foreign languages, which tended to deter administrative careerists” (Derluguian 2005, 110-
111). Some self-selection is thus likely to have been at work in that the dissident minded often chose technical 
professions unburdened with ideological dogma. Rigby (1968, 446) also speculates that “… a more permissive 
attitude” might have been at work towards “first rate scholars, allowing them to avoid the burdens and 
distractions of party membership which are pressed more insistently on their humbler colleagues[?].” 
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S9.1: Factors predicting whether a region would become a Type 3 or Type 4 region (logit 
estimates) 
 
 
Type 3 
region 
Type 4 
region 
Population 0.0001 -0.001** 
 
(0.000) (0.001) 
Population density -0.024 0.019* 
 
(0.028) (0.011) 
External border of the 
USSR 0.094 
 
 
(1.278) 
 Infant mortality -0.003 0.039 
 
(0.095) (0.084) 
Share of ethnic Russians -0.015 0.044** 
 
(0.026) (0.020) 
Steel production 0.0002** -0.0002 
 
(0.0001) (0.0003) 
Coal production -0.014 -0.231 
 
(0.023) (0.207) 
Constant -1.079 -4.426 
 
(4.912) (2.874) 
Observations 69 58 
Pseudo R-squared 0.141 0.223 
Note: robust standard errors applied. Soviet-era variables applied. The number of 
observations is lower than in Table 2 since some observations are excluded as completely 
determined.  
 
Next, we run our baseline regression with party saturation levels as the dependent variable 
and literacy as the right-hand variable, but introduce interaction terms between literacy and 
the key variables described above. We find the following interaction terms to be significant: 
(a) steel production (it is negative, again, showing that regions with a large steel industry had 
lower CPSU membership for a given literacy level); (b) the share of ethnic Russians (it is 
positive, suggesting that in the “ethnic” regions comparable levels of literacy resulted in lower 
CPSU saturation levels); (c) two of the four indicators of repressed ethnic groups: share of 
repressed ethnic groups in the current regional population; and regions (dummy variable) that 
suffered repressions (irrespective of whether the peoples subjected to repressions 
subsequently resettled again in the region or not). The result for the first indicator of 
repression suggests that if the share of repressed groups in a region had been larger, the Soviet 
government showed less interest in coopting the educated strata of these groups, or that these 
educated strata were more reluctant to accept the offer of cooptation. The result with regard to 
the second indicator of repression suggests that in some cases the repressed ethnic groups may 
have represented a large proportion of literates before the Revolution, but that repression 
made the link between literacy and party saturation weaker. An example of an ethnic group 
with high literacy levels, as discussed in SA S5, is the Volga Germans. The Volga Germans 
had been deported to Central Asia, but many of the deportees remained in Central Asia as late 
as the 1990s and then emigrated to Germany as part of the country’s program to repatriate 
ethnic Germans to their historical homeland.  
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S10.2: Interaction terms between literacy and other variables  
Steel production 
 
Coal production 
-0.0005* 
(0.0003) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
External border of the USSR 0.003 
(0.031) 
Population density 0.009 
(0.013) 
Infant mortality 0.002 
(0.005) 
Share of ethnic Russians 0.002* 
(0.001) 
Population 0.000007 
(0.00001) 
Dummy repressed ethnic groups (baseline specification) -0.479 
(0.304) 
Share of repressed ethnic groups in the regional population -0.852* 
(0.467) 
Share of repressed ethnic groups and Jewish people in the regional 
population 
-0.620 
(0.598) 
Dummy for regions, from which particular ethnic groups had been 
deported, irrespective of whether these groups returned to their 
regions of origin or not  
-0.063** 
(0.028) 
 
Note: the regressions are estimated using all control variables listed in Table 2, model (1). 
Furthermore, we add to regressions the baseline terms required to obtain the interaction terms: 
for example, in the model estimating the impact of the interaction term between literacy and 
population density, we add population density to the set of covariates as well. In case of coal 
and steel production, we employ all of the control variables listed in Table 2, model (1) and 
simultaneously add the following variables: (a) coal production; (b) steel production; (c) 
interaction term between coal production and literacy; (d) interaction term between steel 
production and literacy.  
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Appendix S10: Moderating effect of CPSU saturation 
 
The findings presented in the main body of the paper appear to confirm—both conceptually 
and empirically—that mediation analysis is appropriate for the purposes of this study: the 
potential mediator is strongly correlated with the predictor, and the effect of the predictor on 
the outcome variable is significant and robust. Nevertheless, we also perform moderation 
analysis directly, employing the interaction terms. The rationale for employing the 
moderation analysis is as follows. In addition to observations “on the line” of the regression 
of party saturation on literacy, there is also a small number of regions located “off the line,” 
that is, regions in which levels of party saturation do not co-vary with literacy. Our theory 
suggests that the number of these regions should be very small (these are anomalous cases as 
discussed in Appendix S9). Our empirical observations confirm that in this small group of 
regions, as compared to the rest of the sample, a different mechanism may be at work linking 
pre-communist education and post-communist democracy. 
 
The moderation analysis would allow us to ascertain how “over-performance” or “under-
performance” in party saturation levels affected the way pre-communist literacy influenced 
post-communist democratic governance. It is possible to conjecture that in regions where 
party saturation turned out to be lower than what we would expect given past literacy levels, 
the legacy of pre-communist education would have persisted to a greater extent and the 
“appropriation-and-subversion” mechanism would not have been in evidence; thus, in these 
regions, we would expect the positive impact of pre-communist literacy on post-communist 
democratization to be stronger. On the other hand, if the magnitude of party saturation were 
substantially higher than what we would expect given past literacy levels, we may conjecture 
that the positive effect of pre-communist education would be constrained to a particularly 
large extent.  This is because, hypothetically, the educated strata under such a scenario would 
experience particularly strong pressures (stemming from high levels of party saturation) to 
adjust their behaviors to conform to the new environment. This line of argumentation suggests 
a possible moderation effect of party saturation on the impact of pre-communist literacy on 
post-communist democratization. This effect should be present only in regions with strong 
deviation of the CPSU membership share from what we would expect given levels of pre-
communist literacy. We conjecture that while for the majority of the regions “on the 
regression line” (of the regression of CPSU membership on pre-communist literacy) we have 
to model the effect as a mediating one, for a small number of regions “off the regression line” 
we could possibly expect a moderating effect.  
 
Some preliminary observations can be derived from Table 4 of the main part of the paper 
already. As noted earlier, the Type 1 and Type 2 regions perform as predicted in terms of 
correspondence between literacy levels and CPSU member saturation. We observe that 
regions with high literacy and high levels of party saturation have a slightly higher level of 
democracy than regions with low literacy and low levels of party saturation, but the difference 
is very small. The Type 3 and 4 regions are more interesting from the point of view of 
possible moderation effects. Type 3 includes regions with below the expected levels of party 
saturation considering their pre-communist literacy levels. This very small group of regions 
features the highest democracy achievers. Interestingly, on average, the literacy level in these 
regions is actually lower than in Type 1 regions. Nevertheless, considering the lower-than-
expected levels of party saturation, the values on the democracy score are substantially higher 
than in regions with higher literacy and higher levels of party saturation. The Type 4 group of 
regions encompasses regions with higher-than-expected party membership levels considering 
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their imperial literacy levels. The democracy scores of these regions are slightly lower than 
those of regions with low pre-communist literacy and low levels of party saturation. 
 
We test for the moderation effect explicitly. We run our baseline regression, but add an 
interaction term between the variables of pre-communist literacy and CPSU membership. As 
expected, the interaction term as such is insignificant; this is not surprising, considering that 
both the baseline variables are highly correlated (the correlation is an empirical confirmation 
of the mediation model that we chose on theoretical grounds). Thus, the first impression 
appears to be that there is no evidence of moderation. In the next step, however, we 
concentrate on the “off-the-line observations,” for which it would be interesting to ascertain 
the presence of a moderating effect. For this purpose we first regress the CPSU membership 
variable on the pre-communist literacy variable, as well as on controls from specification 1 of 
Table 2 of the main part of the paper and compute the absolute value of residuals. We then 
regress the democracy score on literacy, CPSU membership, and the interaction term between 
these variables, as well as on other controls, while employing only the observations for which 
the absolute value of residuals from the regression of CPSU membership on literacy is 
sufficiently large—that is, the observations are sufficiently far away from the regression line 
of CPSU membership and pre-communist literacy. As a threshold we employ one standard 
deviation of the absolute value of residuals. Note that we retain a sufficiently large number of 
observations for which pre-communist literacy is a good predictor of CPSU membership, but 
if we drop more observations, running an econometric model becomes impossible. We 
observe that the results in these regressions change dramatically. The interaction term is now 
significant and negative, suggesting that the positive effect of pre-communist literacy 
diminishes if party saturation levels go up.  
 
Summing up, if we look at regions in which party saturation deviated from expected values—
that is, a-typical regions, located at a substantial distance from the regression line, in addition 
to the observed appropriation and subversion mediation effect discussed above, we also find 
evidence of a moderating effect: CPSU saturation reduces the positive effect that pre-
communist literacy otherwise appears to have on post-communist regional democratic 
governance. This observation should be treated as a secondary result, in addition to the 
paper’s main finding—in most regions pre-communist literacy had a strong effect on party 
saturation levels.   
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S10.1: Regression estimations (dependent variable is democracy; we employ the 
Carnegie democracy index, 2000-2004) 
 (1) (2) 
Share of CPSU members, 1970s -1.434 -1.044 
 (0.890) (0.979) 
Literacy, 1897 0.771** 1.002** 
 (0.306) (0.391) 
Share of CPSU members * Literacy -0.049 -0.076* 
 (0.030) (0.040) 
Education, 2002 0.260 0.474* 
 (0.222) (0.266) 
Income, 2000-2004  1.115** 1.246* 
 (0.531) (0.710) 
Share of ethnic Russians, 2002 0.119** 0.176*** 
 (0.056) (0.060) 
Dummy republic -0.423 0.623 
 (2.674) (3.288) 
Distance from Moscow -0.368 -0.331 
 (0.223) (0.300) 
Log oil and gas extraction, 2000-2004  (measured in coal 
equivalent) 
0.187 
-0.323 
 (0.548) (0.811) 
Constant 17.397* 5.989 
 (10.123) (11.563) 
Observations 77 49 
R-squared 0.476 0.561 
Regions with high correlation between literacy and CPSU 
membership excluded 
No 
Yes 
Note: see Table 1  
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Appendix S11: Additional data on social and educational backgrounds of party recruits, 
1920s-1930s 
 
S11.1:  Class Composition and Occupation of Party Membership, 1922-1932.  
Date 
 
Class composition (%) Current occupation (%) 
Jan. 1 Workers Peasants White-
collar 
workers 
Workers Individual 
and 
collective 
farmers 
White-
collar 
workers 
and others 
1922 44.4 26.7 28.9    
1923 44.9 25.7 29.4    
1924 44.0 28.8 27.2 18.8   
1925 56.7 26.5 16.8 41.3 9.5 49.2 
1926 56.8 25.9 17.3 42.0 13.4 44.6 
1927 55.1 27.3 17.6 39.4 13.7 46.9 
1928 56.8 22.9 20.3 40.8 12.3 46.9 
1929 61.4 21.7 16.9 44.0 13.0 43.0 
1930 64.3 20.2 14.5 46.3 12.0 41.7 
1931    44.1 16.3 39.5 
1932 65.2 26.9 7.9 43.8 18.5 37.6 
Note: This table illustrates the over-representation of white-collar workers by current 
occupation among party members.  As discussed in the paper, class composition masks the 
upward mobility of workers and peasants who had already occupied white collar positions 
before the 1917 Revolution even though they continued to be listed as “workers” and 
“peasants” in Soviet records. 
Source: Rigby 1968, 116. 
 
S11.2: Class Composition of Postpurge recruits, Compared with 1929 recruits.  
 1929 enrollment 
(% of all enrolments) 
Enrollments Nov. 1936-
March 1939 (% of all 
enrolments) 
Workers 81.2 41.0 
Peasants 17.1 15.2 
Intelligentsia and white-
collar workers 
1.7 43.8 
Note: These figures refer only to those enrolled in the particular year listed in the column.  
They do not refer to overall share of the various categories in the party (as listed in S12.1). 
Rigby notes that the 1929 enrolment was when “the proletarian bias was at its height.” 
Source: Rigby, 1968, 223. 
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S11.3: Pre-war Employment of 14,821 Leading Provincial Communists in 1921 (%) 
 Gubernia 
officials 
Uezd 
officials 
Reserve Total 
1. Agriculture 
(a) Self-employed, farm laborers, petty 
functionaries 
(b) Administrative and office staff 
 
7.6 
 
1.0 
 
19.6 
 
0.6 
 
14.4 
 
0.6 
 
16.3 
 
0.7 
2. Plants and factories 
(a) Workers and petty functionaries 
(b) Administrative and office staff 
 
19.4 
5.3 
 
18.6 
3.7 
 
20.8 
2.7 
 
19.0 
3.9 
3. Transport 
(a) Workers and petty functionaries 
(b) Administrative and office staff 
 
3.7 
1.6 
 
3.0 
0.9 
 
4.7 
1.8 
 
3.4 
1.2 
4. Artisans 
(a) Owners of workshops 
(b) Hired workers 
 
1.6 
5.3 
 
1.7 
5.8 
 
1.5 
6.6 
 
1.6 
5.9 
5. Trade 
(a) Administrative and office staff 
(b) Petty functionaries 
 
2.5 
2.7 
 
2.3 
2.8 
 
2.6 
3.2 
 
2.4 
2.9 
6. State, public and private institutions 
(a) Senior staff 
(b) Petty functionaries 
 
20.3 
4.0 
 
17.5 
3.4 
 
14.9 
3.2 
 
17.7 
3.5 
7. Free professions 3.7 1.9 1.6 2.2 
8. Others 5.0 4.4 4.8 4.6 
9. Dependents 15.2 12.4 15.5 13.5 
10. No data 1.1 1.4 1.1 1.4 
Note: This table illustrates the high representation of white collar employees and in particular 
of senior staff previously employed in tsarist public and private institutions among 
professional backgrounds of party officials.  Note that at the Guberniya level there is a greater 
tendency for a higher representation of those who occupied higher-status professions during 
the imperial period as compared to the Uezd level.  As discussed in the paper, many 
individuals engaged in white collar occupations before the Revolution (such as petty 
functionaries) would have featured as “peasants” (a reference to their estate rather than 
occupation) in Bolshevik records. 
Source: Rigby 1990, 35. 
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Appendix S12: The effects of purges on continuity in the reproduction of party cadre 
 
In Table 2, in S5 and in S9, we presented results of statistical analysis of the effects of Stalin-
era repressions against particular ethnic groups on party saturation levels. In this section, we 
provide a discussion of how the purges may have affected the continuity in the reproduction 
of imperial legacies, specifically, in the recruitment of the better-educated strata with human 
capital advantages acquired during the tsarist period. Before we present the relevant data on 
the effects of repressions on the party, we ought to provide some general discussion as to 
recent research into repressions generally and specifically on the regional aspect of purges. 
The purges represent a vast topic and we do not purport to do full justice to it here. Although 
volumes have been written on the purges, no systematic account exists on their effects—
numbers arrested and shot, numbers exiled, numbers of those released from labour camps and 
returning to their home regions, etc.—across the regions in Russia, though the Russian NGO 
Memorial is engaged in an effort to collect such regional data. Rigby (1968) provides some 
evidence of the implications of repressions for regional party cadre, but the regional data are 
for select regions only.  Furthermore, his account had been written before the NKVD archives 
were opened in the 1990s and scholars gained access to the full horrors of Stalinism. The 
published accounts that do consider the latest archival revelations are however (unlike 
Rigby’s account) concerned with national-level statistics on repressions, and, at best, on those 
for the republics that used to be part of the USSR (Conquest 2008; Ellman 2002; Rosefielde 
1997).  Thus, systematic statistics for RSFSR regions are lacking. The authors of this paper 
have been involved in an historical project (with other colleagues) one of the ambitions of 
which is to map data on repressions, but the work has not been carried out so far.  
Furthermore, the statistics on people who perished in the purges should not obscure the 
potential effects of purges on the values and behaviours of those who survived. The record of 
repressions is bound to have affected levels of citizen trust across the regions (given the 
known record of denunciations under Stalin’s rule). Thus, the physical extinction of many 
people is only part of the story; the values (and human capital, if we focus on the issue of 
trust) of those who survived are also relevant for our historical analysis. While we do not seek 
to minimise the horrific impact of repressions on the social fabric of Russia’s regions, two 
observations, based on earlier and more recent historical analyses of repressions are in order. 
First, social science accounts more transparent about the demographic realities of the Soviet 
state than accounts targeting the general reader indicate that however ghastly, “repression 
mortality  (excluding famine, war and disease mortality, and repression survivors) was only a 
modest part of the demographic history of the USSR” (emphasis original) (Ellman 2002, 
1164). This observation relates to the point made above about the suffering that all Soviet 
people endured in the course of Stalin’s rule, even though there are likely to be variations in 
how some regions were affected by the repressions. The statistics on purges that we present 
below provide some perspective on the numbers of those repressed in proportion to the 
general population. Second, what became evident in particular after the NKVD archives were 
opened was the indiscriminatory nature of purges. Although there were several waves of 
purges targeting particular individuals (and party cadre of particular ranks), we now know 
from the archives and family records of ordinary people that pretty much everyone—
including innocent school-age children—was vulnerable to arrest, exile, and execution 
(Conquest 2008; Figes 2007). Thus, while some regions may have been affected more than 
others (for instance, St. Petersburg and Moscow would have been particularly affected by the 
Great Purge targeting senior party cadre and Old Bolsheviks), the repressions are likely to 
have affected citizens in all regions. Our analysis of repressed groups presented in S4 covers 
the regions in which virtually the entire populations suffered, so we are able, to some extent, 
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to address the question of how the variations in regional intensity of repressions might affect 
our results.  
 
We now proceed to discuss how the purges affected the party in particular, and specifically, to 
what extent they may have put a break on the reproduction and recruitment of individuals 
with human capital advantages acquired during the imperial order. The word “purge” 
(chistka) has come to refer to the full spectrum of Stalinist repression—from expulsions from 
the party, scrutiny of party cards, and suspension of party “candidate” status, most of which 
occurred in 1933-1936—to the orgy of arrests, incarceration, and executions in 1937-1938 
that are referred to as the Great Purge. While some purges targeted the “class alien” elements 
in particular (Rigby 1968, 204), we now know that the purges affected all social strata—from 
peasant and worker “provocateurs” (Rigby 1968, 210) to the ostensible anti-regime plotters 
among the educated Old Bolsheviks (Conquest 2008). The purges, particularly the 1937-1938 
Great Terror, which targeted the Old Bolsheviks, put a significant break on the continuity in 
the membership of senior party cadre. This is evidenced by the stark change in the corps of 
delegates to the March 1939 Party Congress (Conquest 2008, 438). The purges of the rank- 
and-file appear to have affected membership continuity to a lesser extent. Rigby provides 
some statistics on regional purges, though, as noted above, his account had been written 
before the NKVD archives were opened. Many of those purged in 1934-1936 were arguably 
subsequently reinstated into the party—this record of reinstatement of many formerly 
expelled members is actually in line with accounts of repressions that emerged after the 
Soviet archives were opened in the 1990s. Kirov, a “typical region,” provides an illustrative 
example of the effects of the 1935 purge on party membership. Out of 2,350 full members and 
2,533 candidates, 107 “expulsions” were reported—approximately 2 percent of 
membership—when party cards were exchanged (Rigby 1968, 209). The Great Purge had the 
most horrific toll on the general citizenry and the party.  An estimated 950,000-1.2 million 
(Ellman 2002) Soviet citizens—out of the USSR’s population of roughly 160 million in 1937 
(Rosefielde 1997)—had been shot or perished in the labor camps in 1937-1938. The party lost 
some 100,000 members (Rigby 1968, 212) to expulsions, arrests, and executions in this last 
purge. To put these figures into perspective, note that the total number of full party members 
in 1937 was 1,453,828 (Fainsod 1970; Rigby 1968)). 
 
A new—and energetic—recruitment drive commenced at the height of the Great Purge, in 
June 1937, with over 400,000 recruits added to the party’s ranks by the end of 1938.  A record 
number of 1,100,000 recruits were added to the party in 1939, with regional party officials 
even accused of “indiscriminate chasing after numbers,” by 1940 “admit[ting] almost all who 
applied” (Rigby 1968, 220).  And it is among these recruits, described as “The Best People” 
that Rigby observes “a complete break with [the] proletarian bias” that the Bolsheviks sought 
to maintain during the earlier waves of party recruitment (Rigby 1968, 221). In Chelyabinsk, 
for instance, workers constituted under 20 percent of new party recruits in 1939-1941, and 
peasants under 10 percent, while the intelligentsia and white collar workers—over 70 percent 
(Rigby 1968, 225). In the Leningrad party organization in 1937, “some 40 percent of the new 
candidates and 50 of those who became full members were scientists, teachers, engineers and 
technicians, doctors, students and office workers” (Rigby 1968, 222). Note that these statistics 
come from Soviet-era records and it is unlikely that these records would have inflated the 
numbers of “non-proletarian” cadre.  
 
What do these statistics tell us about the reproduction of cadre with human capital advantages 
acquired during the imperial era or with family backgrounds that would have provided the 
necessary cultural capital to acquire the relevant credentials? Despite the known “young” 
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demographic characteristic of the above new recruits (Fainsod 1970), we may assume that 
“scientists” would have been born some years before the Bolshevik Revolution and would 
have acquired at least part of their education in the imperial period. In fact, this observation 
would likely apply to all of the above categories except for students, who would have been 
twenty years old or younger in 1937 if they had been born after 1917. A large share of 
entrants into higher educational institutions in the 1920s in fact came from educated family 
backgrounds. As Fitzpatrick notes, throughout the 1920s, the pre-Revolutionary “old” 
intelligentsia continued to staunchly—and successfully—fight to preserve its gatekeeping 
authority in admissions to prestigious educational establishments. Specifically, it resisted the 
Bolsheviks’ attempts to “dilute” the standards of higher education via affirmative action 
policies favoring those with proletarian or peasant origins. In the 1920s, it also secured 
preferential treatment—reserved quota of places and exemption from fees—(Fitzpatrick 1979) 
in university admissions for its offspring. Our discussion in the main body of the paper also 
illustrates how the so-called “new soviet-trained” (as distinct from “old”) intelligentsia also 
tended to come from strata already upwardly mobile under the old order even if they 
continued to be listed in early Bolshevik records according to estate origin (such as “peasants” 
who were actually teachers or office workers); had been trained in imperial institutions of 
higher learning; and had already occupied white-collar positions under the old regime. Both 
the “old” and “new” intelligentsia tended to colonise higher educational establishments in the 
1920s and 1930s despite the Bolsheviks’ attempts to encourage farm and factory workers to 
pursue advanced education. As Lane writes, in 1923-1924, “the ‘working-intelligentsia’ and 
their children accounted for more than half of all students at university (50.5 percent),” while 
in 1927 “forty-five percent of all students were [still] of non-manual status” (Lane 1973, 246). 
Further analysis is required to more conclusively establish patterns of inter-generational 
reproduction of educational advantage—and likelihood of party entry—among those with 
better-educated ancestry, despite Stalinist purges. Nevertheless, these statistics—and of 
course our own systematic analysis of the link between imperial literacy and democracy; and 
between imperial literacy and party saturation—serve to debunk the soviet propaganda—
picked up by some western scholars—about how the USSR built a new society and created a 
“new” (Fainsod 1970) intelligentsia virtually from scratch (including through purges of the 
social un-desirables from the party). 
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Appendix S13: Large-N evidence of legacy persistence 
 
Bureaucracy 
 
To explore the bureaucratic channel of persistence of legacies of party saturation in post-
communist Russia, we focus on two characteristics of bureaucracies in Russia’s regions in the 
early 2000s: their size (measured as number of civil servants per capita); and the average 
tenure of regional officials. Data for both of the indicators are obtained from official Russian 
statistical compilations, which refer to all civil servants as bureaucrats; these data do not 
include employees of state-owned enterprises and public sector employees like teachers or 
doctors, as well as military and security servicemen.  
 
The size of the bureaucracy is relevant for regional governance because it has implications for 
regional executive power consolidation. For example, civil servants in regional bodies may be 
relied upon to perform anti-corruption checks on private companies; to organize and to 
supervise the process of electoral falsifications; and to ensure control over the wider citizenry. 
If the bureaucracy is small, the capacity of the regional governor to exercise these tasks may 
be limited, and hence his/ her ability to consolidate power is more modest. Bureaucratic 
tenure may be relevant for understanding patterns of regional governance for two reasons. 
First, longer tenure typically increases the extent to which regional civil servants would have 
been socialized in public sector institutions and would have internalized the relevant norms of 
bureaucratic behavior. Second, longer tenure indicates that civil servants may have 
commenced their service or spent a large portion of their careers in the Soviet era. Soviet 
bureaucracy was generally known for its compliance with political leadership directives (on 
Russian bureaucracies, see (Ryavec 2003). Summing up, bureaucracies with on average 
longer tenure may be more likely to exhibit greater levels of compliance with the demands of 
regional governors; in turn, larger bureaucracies may have greater capacity to execute the will 
of regional leaders. Both of these characteristics of regional bureaucracies may have 
detrimental effects on regional democracy.  
 
We test how the legacies of pre-communist literacy and party saturation have affected the 
composition of regional bureaucracies in Russia in the 2000s. For this purpose, we regress the 
size of bureaucracy per capita of the regional population, as well as the share of bureaucrats 
with sufficiently long tenure (in excess of ten years) on the pre-communist literacy variable 
and on the party saturation variable. We also employ several control variables. Specifically, 
we control for education levels in the regions, which could affect the demand for public 
administration careers; and regional income levels; we also include a dummy variable for 
ethnic republics considering that this variable may have a bearing on how public offices are 
filled. The results are reported below. On the one hand, we observe a strong and significant 
effect of CPSU saturation legacy: regions with larger party saturation levels continue to 
maintain larger bureaucracies and tend to have a higher share of civil servants with longer 
tenure. On the other hand, we see that pre-Communist literacy has no impact on the 
composition of bureaucracy.  
 
Next, we estimate the impact of bureaucracy on post-communist regional democratic 
development. For this purpose, we use specification (1) of Table 1 and control, in addition to 
the literacy and party saturation variables, for the tenure and size of bureaucracy variables. 
Tenure has, as expected, a significant and negative effect. If we drop the variables of party 
saturation and pre-communist literacy, this negative effect persists. For the size of 
bureaucracy, the effects are weaker. If we merely regress the level of democracy on the 
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regional share of bureaucracy variable, we find no effect. However, in contrast to the tenure 
variable, the distribution of the size of bureaucracy is characterized by a few outliers. Only 
four regions have bureaucracies exceeding 17 percent of the population: two of them 
(Magadan and Chukotka) are located in the Far East and have very small populations. When 
we drop the four outliers, we find a negative effect of the size of bureaucracy on democracy, 
but only if we do not control for the CPSU membership and literacy variables. 
 
Finally, we seek to understand the role of bureaucracy in the persistence of the party 
saturation legacy. For this purpose, we again employ mediation analysis: we employ 
democracy as the outcome, CPSU membership as the predictor, and bureaucracy 
characteristics as mediator variables. We employ specifications from the tables below, but do 
not control for pre-communist literacy. The exercise we perform here is similar to that in the 
main part of the paper. In the main body of the paper, we decomposed the effect of pre-
communist literacy on democracy into a direct effect and an indirect effect (which goes 
through party saturation). Now we decompose the effect of party saturation (which, as shown 
above, is negative), into a direct effect and an indirect effect (going through the mechanism of 
bureaucratic structure). In this case, we expect both the direct and indirect effects to be 
negative.  
 
For tenure, one can see that the indirect effect is significant and negative; the direct effect is 
negative as well, but not significant. Bureaucratic tenure accounts for 39 percent of the total 
negative effect of the party saturation legacy on democracy. For the size of bureaucracy 
variable, the indirect effect is negative, but not significantly different from zero; this effect 
accounts only for 13 percent of the total negative influence of the CPSU legacy on democracy 
(if outliers are excluded).  
 
Summing up, the composition of regional bureaucracy appears to be an important channel of 
persistence of the party saturation legacy. In particular, the length of tenure of regional 
officials appears to account for the observed effects. There are several reasons why past party 
membership could affect the composition of regional bureaucracies. First, at the beginning of 
the transition, already the low-level managerial positions in regional bureaucracies had been 
occupied by party members. It is possible that in regions with large numbers of CPSU 
members, Soviet-era officials preferred recruiting other fellow party members to new 
positions (because of shared values and modes of governance, for instance). Therefore, old 
patterns of Soviet bureaucratic behavior would have a high chance of being reproduced over 
time. In regions with few party members, new recruits to bureaucracy would have likely 
lacked a record of past CPSU affiliation, and therefore old behavioral patterns would have 
had a lower chance of persistence. Second, in high party-saturated regions, political leaders 
may find it easier to fill bureaucratic positions with individuals willing to comply with the 
demands of regional leaders. Again, if regional party saturation had been low, finding such 
compliant individuals and filling bureaucratic positions with them would have been more 
challenging. Third, a large share of CPSU members in the population may have increased 
general levels of popular acceptance for the perpetuation of Soviet-era bureaucracy in power 
(and the informal practices that come with it and that citizens would have been accustomed to 
as a way of getting things done).  
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S13.1: The effect of pre-communist literacy and party saturation on features of regional 
bureaucracy, OLS 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. var. 
 
 
 
 
Share of 
bureaucrats  
in regional 
population, 
2000-2004 
 
Share of 
bureaucrats 
with tenure 
exceeding 
10 years, 
2002 
Share of 
bureaucrats  
in regional 
population, 
2000-2004 
 
Share of 
bureaucrats 
with tenure 
exceeding 
10 years,  
2002 
Party saturation, 1970s 1.607** 2.252***   
 (0.617) (0.522)   
Literacy, 1897 -0.094 -0.121 0.034 0.001 
 
(0.060) (0.086) (0.046) (0.001) 
Education, 2002 -0.831*** -0.325* -0.718** -0.002 
 
(0.288) (0.186) (0.274) (0.002) 
Income, 2000-2004  1.142 -1.708*** 1.271* -0.015*** 
 
(0.696) (0.361) (0.744) (0.004) 
Dummy republic 2.340* -1.021 0.874 -0.031* 
 
(1.197) (1.670) (1.144) (0.016) 
Constant 8.598* 35.646*** 17.363*** 0.479*** 
 
(5.132) (4.230) (3.296) (0.036) 
Observations 77 77 77 77 
R-squared 0.302 0.369 0.208 0.248 
 
Note: see Table 1 
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S13.2: The effect of regional bureaucracy on democracy, 2000-2004, OLS 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Party saturation, 1970s -2.016***  -2.444***  -2.440***  
 
(0.662)  (0.703)  (0.695)  
Literacy, 1897 0.266***  0.309***  0.319***  
 
(0.070)  (0.071)  (0.071)  
Share of bureaucrats  in 
regional population, 2000-
2004   0.012 -0.112 -0.254 -0.547* 
   (0.167) (0.167) (0.348) (0.305) 
Share of bureaucrats with 
tenure exceeding 10 years, 
2002 -21.410* -38.484***     
 (12.618) (13.703)     
Education, 2002 0.054 0.096 0.139 0.152 -0.019 0.006 
 (0.217) (0.243) (0.231) (0.272) (0.229) (0.290) 
Income, 2000-2004  0.579 0.201 0.746* 0.547 1.020** 0.723 
 
(0.415) (0.472) (0.439) (0.609) (0.499) (0.705) 
Share of ethnic Russians, 
2002 0.152** 0.202*** 0.124** 0.150*** 0.102* 0.142** 
 
(0.064) (0.063) (0.056) (0.052) (0.060) (0.055) 
Dummy republic 0.355 2.894 -0.639 1.644 -1.471 1.502 
 
(2.996) (3.054) (2.810) (2.901) (3.108) (3.223) 
Distance from Moscow -0.427* -0.561** -0.273 -0.216 -0.149 -0.016 
 
(0.238) (0.251) (0.240) (0.216) (0.271) (0.237) 
Log oil and gas extraction, 
2000-2004 (measured in 
coal equivalent) 0.149 0.459 0.36 0.904 0.212 0.809 
 
(0.533) (0.538) (0.538) (0.555) (0.563) (0.579) 
Constant 35.189*** 26.814*** 29.001*** 13.652* 34.780*** 19.855** 
 
(8.588) (8.351) (8.406) (7.573) (8.842) (8.440) 
Observations 77 79 77 79 73 75 
R-squared 0.481 0.414 0.459 0.337 0.48 0.352 
Outliers excluded No No No No Yes Yes 
 
S13.3: Mediation analysis (democracy = outcome; CPSU membership = predictor; 
bureaucracy = mediator) 
Characteristics of bureaucracy Effect Mean 95% confidence interval 
Tenure ACME -0.520 -1.127 -0.096 
 Direct effect -0.802 -1.906 0.271 
 Total effect -1.322 -2.448 -0.145 
Size (full sample) ACME -0.023 -0.523 0.415 
 Direct effect -1.124 -2.419 0.135 
 Total effect -1.147 -2.486 0.150 
Size (outliers excluded) ACME -0.171 -0.635 0.132 
 Direct effect -1.022 -2.332 0.252 
 Total effect -1.193 -2.458 0.110 
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S13.4: Sensitivity analysis 
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S13.5: Distribution of key characteristics of regional bureaucracies in Russia’s regions 
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Electoral behavior 
 
Another possible channel of legacy persistence could be associated with voting behavior and 
thus with mass attitudes rather than with elite values and conduct. To provide some 
suggestive evidence in this respect, we analyze the votes obtained by key parties during two 
electoral campaigns—the State Duma elections of 1999 and 2003 (the closest ones to the 
period of our investigation). For 1999, we examine the shares of votes obtained in each region 
by the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF); by Unity, the party supporting 
Vladimir Putin; and by Fatherland–All Russia, the coalition of leading Russian governors 
supporting the former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov. For 2003, we again analyze the 
results obtained by CPRF and United Russia, the newly formed “party of power” supporting 
Putin, which came into existence as a result of the merger of Unity and Fatherland–All 
Russia. We correlated the shares of votes for these parties with the variable of CPSU 
saturation in the 1970s and with the pre-Soviet literacy variable. The results reported below 
are unambiguous: we do not observe a significant correlation between CPSU saturation and 
regional voting. These results imply that the electoral channel is unlikely to explain the 
persistence of party saturation legacies.  
 
Interestingly, we find significant evidence of the effect of pre-communist literacy on electoral 
behavior. First, in regions with higher share of literates in the late 19
th
 century, the share of 
votes for CPRF is consistently lower than in the low-literacy regions. Second, for 2003, we 
observe a negative correlation between the share of votes obtained by the pro-Kremlin United 
Russia party and pre-Soviet literacy. The latter trend persists in subsequent electoral 
campaigns: in the 2011 Duma elections, for example, there is also evidence of a negative and 
significant correlation between the vote share for the United Russia party and pre-communist 
literacy. These results imply that the legacy of pre-Communist education counteracts both the 
support for the party of power (or, possibly, the extent of electoral manipulations in its favor) 
and the support for conservative communist forces. Both effects are consistent with higher 
democracy scores in regions with higher pre-communist literacy. These results provide some 
suggestive evidence to the effect that the electoral channel might at least partially drive the 
persistence of the democratic legacy effects of imperial-era literacy. For instance, we may 
conjecture that political attitudes and voting preferences that are more discerning and more 
critical of the powers-that-be and that would have characterized comparatively better-
educated citizens of the imperial era un-coopted by the party, might be transmitted through 
the family; these values may be also reinforced by the higher preference for advanced 
education among the (particularly those un-coopted into the party) descendants of the 
imperial-era’s better-educated strata, as discussed in the main body of the paper.  We 
acknowledge that further research is required to more conclusively ascertain the validity of 
this proposition.  
 
S13.6: Correlations between electoral outcomes, CPSU saturation and literacy 
Party and election year Correlation with 
party saturation 
Correlation 
with literacy 
Communist Party of the Russian Federation, 2003 -0.146 -0.282** 
United Russia, 2003 -0.131 -0.196* 
Communist Party of the Russian Federation, 1999 -0.184 -0.360*** 
Unity, 1999 0.042 -0.118 
Fatherland–All Russia (OVR), 1999 -0.014 0.074 
Note: *** significant at 1% level; ** 5%; * 10% 
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Societal channel 
To test for the societal effects of party saturation that we also conjectured in the main body of 
the paper (in addition to the bureaucracy/ elite channels discussed in the paper and tested 
above), we perform tests ascertaining the links between party saturation and oppositional 
societal protest activism—that is, activism unrelated to Soviet-style routinized forms of 
participation organized by the regional regimes. As a straightforward test of the impact of 
CPSU legacies on compliant political behavior, we could try to ascertain whether ceteris 
paribus, public protests are less frequent in regions which had large CPSU membership in the 
past. The test would also help us ascertain whether in regions with higher party saturation, the 
compliance-fostering norms of party members would have higher chances of being accepted 
by the wider citizenry (horizontal norm transmission) and survive over generations (vertical 
norm transmission). For this test, we employ an original author-constructed dataset with 
protest event count data in Russia’s regions covering the years 2007-2012. The dataset 
contains information on political, economic, social and civic protests. A detailed description 
of the protest dataset is provided at the end of this section. The information on how the 
various protests were coded into political, economic, social and civic is provided in S13.9. 
 
We regress the aggregate number of protests for all years on the variable of share of CPSU 
members in Russia’s regions in the 1970s, as well as on three other relevant covariates. 
Specifically, we control for urbanization (averaged for 2007-2012) because urban populations 
may be more likely to get involved in protests due to stronger preferences for political 
freedoms, economic well-being etc., and may possess a greater volume of mobilizational 
resources and capacity; ethnic republic status employing a dummy variable (because of the 
known low levels of protest in the ethnic republics); we also employ a proxy for citizen 
perception of economic well-being. Data for the latter variable is obtained from Georating, a 
large-scale public opinion survey regularly carried out by FOM (Public Opinion Foundation, 
a reputable Russian polling agency), which has a major advantage of being based on 
representative population samples in each region. The FOM well-being perception index is 
based on weighted responses to three questions as part of a survey administered in 2007: (a) 
how happy people are with the overall situation in the region and whether they think that the 
situation is improving or deteriorating; (b) how happy citizens are with their material well-
being and whether they perceive it as improving or deteriorating; and (c) whether people are 
generally satisfied with their lives. The index takes the values of between 0 and 100, with 100 
signifying the most positive responses. We employ this index because human behavior is 
more likely to be driven by subjective perceptions rather than objective income proxies (for 
instance, because income distribution; expectations regarding possible income levels; and 
non-pecuniary and even non-material benefits may matter as well). Regressions are estimated 
using OLS. We exclude the cities of Moscow City and St. Petersburg from the sample: these 
regions recorded very large numbers of protests (only slightly fewer than the number of 
protests in all the other regions taken together), and these protests are often unrelated to 
regional issues, but are driven by national-level concerns (in addition, participants in these 
protests are more likely to come from other regions to take part in national protests). 
 
The results of the analysis are presented below in S13.7. The results demonstrate that in 
regions with high levels of party saturation in the 1970s the number of political protests is 
significantly lower. The number of economic protests is also significantly lower. For other 
types of protests we find no significant effects. If we control for pre-communist literacy, the 
effect for economic protests remains robust, while the effect for political protests retains its 
sign, but is not significant (in this specification there is a significant and negative effect of the 
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CPSU legacy on the number of civic protests). Imperial-era literacy has no significant effect 
on protest activity. This result suggests that higher levels of education in the imperial period 
may not necessarily result in higher levels of citizen civic and protest activism after seventy 
years of communism. The result for the imperial literacy variable suggests that future research 
going beyond the scope of this paper should consider alternative channels of transmission of 
the imperial literacy effects on democracy. The analysis of regional electoral preferences 
presented above suggests that the electoral channel might go some way towards illuminating 
why imperial literacy is associated with post-communist democratic outcomes in Russia’s 
regions.   
 
S13.7: Effects of legacies on the number of protests 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dep. var. 
 
Political 
protests 
Economic 
protests 
Social 
protests 
Civic 
protests 
Political 
protests 
Economic 
protests 
Social 
protests 
Civic 
protests 
Party saturation, 1976 -1.770* -1.051* -0.277 -0.542 -1.859 -1.373* -1.346 -2.037* 
 
(1.007) (0.605) (1.106) (1.188) (1.305) (0.755) (0.892) (1.195) 
Literacy, 1987 
    
-0.095 0.026 0.093 0.274 
     
(0.223) (0.098) (0.283) (0.407) 
Subjective well-being -0.09 -0.146* -0.044 -0.013 -0.095 -0.149* -0.043 -0.011 
 
(0.087) (0.074) (0.067) (0.067) (0.089) (0.076) (0.069) (0.067) 
Dummy republic 
-
8.437** 
-
6.237*** -4.378* -5.934* 
-
8.420** 
-
6.325*** 
-
5.155** 
-
6.875** 
 
(3.777) (1.979) (2.570) (3.168) (3.802) (1.981) (2.475) (3.228) 
Urbanization, 2007-2012 0.241 0.194** 0.211 0.152 0.248 0.183** 0.18 0.092 
 
(0.156) (0.083) (0.131) (0.161) (0.155) (0.083) (0.128) (0.163) 
Constant 18.153 10.663 -0.82 4.891 20.326 13.658* 8.215 15.957 
 
(12.943) (7.157) (13.050) (16.730) (13.452) (7.473) (9.955) (14.676) 
Observations 77 77 77 77 75 75 75 75 
R-squared 0.113 0.22 0.087 0.08 0.112 0.22 0.086 0.094 
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimation using OLS 
 
Considering that our dependent variable is the number of protests in a given region, 
estimating the regressions employing OLS may be problematic. We therefore perform two 
additional tests. First, we run Tobit regressions to account for the fact that in some regions no 
protests occurred. Our results are confirmed (S13.8).  
 
Second, to take into account both the lack of protests in some regions and the fact that our 
dependent variable is a count variable, we run zero-inflated negative binomial regressions. 
For three of our four protest types (political, economic and civic) the Vuong test is significant, 
confirming that the zero-inflated negative binomial estimator is preferable over the negative 
binomial estimator (the values of the test statistic are 1.81; 1.38; and 1.38 respectively); and 
the LR test aimed at ascertaining the suitability of the zero-inflated negative binomial over the 
zero-inflated Poisson model is significant (implying that the zero-inflated negative binomial 
estimator is more appropriate; the test statistics are 473.14; 183.28; and 449.37 respectively). 
For social protests the zero-inflated negative binomial estimator does not converge, and we 
therefore employ the zero-inflated Poisson model as the second-best option; the significance 
of the Vuong test (2.62) again confirms that the zero-inflated model should be employed 
instead of the simple Poisson model. 
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Both the zero-inflated negative binomial and the zero-inflated Poisson models imply that two 
equations ought to be estimated. The first equation (we use Probit) estimates the impact of the 
covariates on the likelihood that no protests took place in a given region (inflation stage). 
Thus, if a covariate has a positive sign at this stage, it means that this variable makes the 
absence of protests in the region more likely. The second equation estimates how many 
protests in the region should happen given that some protests in the region happen at all. Here, 
if a covariate has a negative sign, it means that if this variable goes up, the number of protests 
(conditional on protests happening at all) goes down. We include CPSU membership in both 
the equations, which allows us to estimate these effects. 
 
The results (S13.8) indicate an even stronger impact of the party saturation variable than those 
obtained earlier. We find that for all types of protests, higher levels of CPSU saturation 
increase the likelihood of protests not happening at all. In the regions where protests do 
happen, the number of recorded protest acts does not depend on CPSU membership. These 
results provide some suggestive evidence to the effect that high levels of regional party 
saturation might discourage all regional protest activity; they do not however indicate that the 
intensity of protest activity (as measured by number of protests events) is affected in regions 
where protests do take place. 
 
S13.8: Effects of legacies on the number of protests (alternative estimators) 
Dep. var. Effect of party 
saturation (Tobit) 
Effect of party 
saturation (zero-
inflated negative 
binomial / Poisson, 
inflation stage) 
Effect of party 
saturation (zero-
inflated negative 
binomial / Poisson, 
negative binomial / 
Poisson stage) 
Political protests -2.230** 
(1.114) 
174.532*** 
(3.344) 
-0.090 
(0.082) 
Economic protests -1.223* 
(0.642) 
6.517*** 
(0.119) 
-0.091 
(0.063) 
Social protests -0.890 
(1.262) 
0.340** 
(0.154) 
0.057 
(0.101) 
Civic protests -0.775 
(1.280) 
6.618*** 
(0.115) 
-0.014 
(0.113) 
Note: The other covariates are the same as those in specifications employed to obtain the OLS 
estimates (we do not control for literacy). In the zero-inflated negative binomial and zero 
inflated Poisson regressions, the covariates of the inflation stage and of the negative binomial 
/ Poisson stages are the same. Robust standard errors are applied. 
 
Description of protest data 
 
Our dataset, assembled from the liberal namarsh.ru website sponsored by the opposition 
politician Garry Kasparov, covers protests ranging from small-scale acts and large-scale 
demonstrations featuring tens of thousands of protesters. It ranges from localised political 
protests, such as demands to remove corrupt local officials, to protests converging on national 
capitals and targeting national authorities. A wide range of protest issues feature in the 
dataset. For instance, in addition to political protests, many protests are motivated by socio-
economic grievances like frustration over wage arrears.  A large number of regional protests 
are concerned with cultural issues, as would be the case when rallies challenge the demolition 
of historic buildings. Note that we exclude rallies that are organized by the regime or its 
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supporters, as would be the case with rallies organized by the United Russia (UR) party or 
pro-government youth movements, such as the notorious pro-Kremlin group Nashi.   
 
We acknowledge that the namarsh.ru, as a liberal-leaning website, may over-report certain 
types of protests—for instance, those organized by liberal-leaning groups at the expense of 
protests organized by the Communist party or other left-leaning parties and groups.  Indeed, 
Robertson and Reuter, who compiled Russian regional protest data based on protest reporting 
by the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), suggest that the data only 
partially correlate with protests reported by the more liberal political sources (Robertson and 
Reuter 2013). While we acknowledge the limitations of the data, we also note that our data 
dovetail with public opinion polls about citizens’ intentions to participate in protest rallies and 
also overall levels of citizen activism in the various regions (Petrov 2005).  As a further check 
on the reliability of our data, we cross-validated our namarsh.ru data with Graeme 
Robertson’s regional protest data, which are based on reports from the left-leaning source 
Institute of Collective Action (IKD) for the period January 2007-March 2012. The number of 
protests reported in Robertson’s dataset is roughly similar to ours, comprising 5540 protest 
events across 74 regions. Regional (log) protest counts across the two datasets over the period 
March 2007-March 2012 are correlated with a correlation coefficient of 77 percent. The table 
below outlines the criteria for coding our protests into the categories of political, civic, social, 
and economic. In the dataset that we employ, the number of protests in individual regions 
varies between zero and seventy-four (political protests); zero and forty-five (economic 
protests); and zero and sixty-nine (both social and civic protests).  
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S13.9: Criteria for coding of protests 
 
Category 
of protest 
 
Criteria for coding 
Political Anti-government protests.  Protests may include other issues, but criticism of 
regime/ government policy/ politics or demands for the protection of 
political rights form the crux of the event. These protests are often organised 
by the political opposition, though they are not exclusive to one particular 
party or civic movement; include events like the March of the Millions, a 
mass civic march organised by the political opposition, and Strategiya-31 
civic meetings organised in support of the right to peaceful assembly. Anti-
government protests organized by nationalist activists (excluding those 
sponsored by the government) were also coded as political protests; 
protests challenging electoral fraud, notably protests that occurred between 
December 2011 and May 2012, as well as protests against local and regional 
instances of electoral fraud; protests featuring calls for resignation of elected 
or appointed officials at all levels of government (regional and local 
politicians and other public officials); protests against political repression, 
such as rallies calling for the release of political prisoners; and protests 
organized by the group Memorial commemorating past victims of political 
repression; protests in support of political activists; against police abuse and 
repression of political activists; protests against aspects of Russia’s foreign 
policy (excluding those organised by pro-regime groups), such as those 
against Russia’s cooperation with Japan over the Kuril Islands, or rallies 
showing solidarity with political events abroad, for instance support for anti-
regime protesters elsewhere. 
Civic Within this category, we distinguish between legal, environmental, and 
cultural protests: 
Legal—protests against lawlessness and unpopular legislation, its 
implementation (labor, criminal and administrative codes); protests against 
acts perceived to be illegal and involving state bodies or private companies 
(forced eviction, illegal construction); 
Environmental—protests against waste dumping, destruction of forests, 
parks and protected woodlands; protests calling for the protection of nature 
reserves and parks;   
Cultural—protests challenging the destruction of monuments and of 
historically significant buildings; against change in city or area names. 
Social Social—protests by socially vulnerable groups like pensioners, victims of 
the Chernobyl’ nuclear reactor accident, students, disabled people, people on 
state welfare.  
Economic Economic—protests challenging government economic policies; rallies 
challenging wage arrears; wage- and worker rights-related labor strikes.  
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